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The Supreme Court has long afforded commercial messages in a
newspaper or magazine less protection than it has the rest of the
publication's content, a doctrinal distinction that is largely supported by
First Amendment scholars. This Article, after a thorough inquiry into the
customs and legislative practices of the generation that framed and
ratified the First Amendment, contends that this contemporaryjudicial and
scholarly treatment of advertising as "low value" speech is misplaced.
After tracing the evolution of the Court's current commercial speech
doctrine-and locating the origins of the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speech in a now-discredited Lochner-era line of
cases-the Article critically assesses the Court's current treatment of
advertising. Although the Court's recent decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island suggests the possibility that the Court is moving towards a
more protective stance in commercial speech cases, the Court persists in
its treatment of advertising as "low value" speech. Accordingly, the
Article concludes that an abandonment of the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech is necessary both to return
modern Supreme Court jurisprudence to original First Amendment
principles and to eliminate the inconsistency and confusion that the
distinction has produced in the lower federal courts.
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Introduction
Advertising dramatically affects what we modems say, wear, do, and
believe. After all, who among us has not moaned "I can't believe I ate the
whole thing," asked "Where's the beef?" or, more recently, joked, "I love
you, man." For good or ill, advertising, in Bill Bennett's words, "incline[s]
and condition[s] [our] views toward a particular world view,' inspiring us
not only to "be all that [we] can be," but also to "just do it."
Advertising also fosters competitive markets and educates Americans
about choices vital to their lives. In fact, as Nobel Prize winning economist
George Stigler observed more than thirty years ago, advertising is "an
immensely powerful instrument for the elimination of ignorance."
2
Advertising is also of intense interest to Americans. To quote the Supreme
Court, "[T]he particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate."3 Justice Scalia was more concrete in
quipping at an oral argument that Americans may care more about their
decision to buy a house than about the war in Bosnia.4
Furthermore, advertising is a highly visible and essential component
of the modem free press. Most newspapers average a ratio of between 65-
70% advertising to 30-35% editorial content. 5 Other publications, such as
magazines, often have an even higher advertisement-to-editorial ratio.
6
The Washington Post reported that 80% of its income "comes from
thousands of businesses, individuals, nonprofit organizations and others
I William J. Bennett, Address at the First Annual Images of Ourselves Conference,
Sponsored by Center for the Study of Popular Culture (Feb. 24, 1996).
2 George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 220 (1961).
3 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763 (1976).
4 See Oral Argument Transcript at 20, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507
U.S. 410 (1993), available in 1992 WL 687873.
5 See CONRAD C. FINK, STRATEGIC NEWSPAPER MANAGEMENT 43 (1988).
6 See, e.g., HALL'S MAGAZINE REPORTS, December 1991, at 10B (reporting that Bride's
magazine consisted of 77.6% advertisements during 1991).
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who buy space to advertise their wares, services, and thoughts."7 It is not
an overstatement to say that advertising is the driving force behind the
information age.
In spite of these beneficial effects of advertising, the Supreme Court
has long treated the commercial messages in a newspaper or magazine
differently than it has the rest of the publication's content. Generally, the
Supreme Court interprets the First Amendment as barring government
efforts to regulate speech based on its content. The government may limit
the time, place, and manner of speech, but only if it does so in a content-
neutral way.'
In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court allows restrictions on
commercial speech-even if that speech is truthful and concerns a product
or service that may be lawfully sold-if the government can show it
"directly advances" a "substantial governmental interest" in a manner "not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." 9 A restriction will
be upheld if there is a "reasonable fit" between the restriction's goals and
the means employed to achieve those goals.0 The specific meaning of
these terms of art, and the way in which this balancing test is applied, is
not important to understanding the basic point: the balancing test gives the
government considerably more power to control the content of advertising
than it has to control the content of other communications, such as those
that concern scientific, artistic, and especially political issues.
Many First Amendment scholars support the Supreme Court's
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech."' For
example, Professor Cass Sunstein argues that political speech should be
firmly protected because it promotes deliberative democracy.12 Sunstein
believes that the First Amendment gives the government much greater
power to regulate commercial speech," which he believes the Supreme
7 ReadAll About It, WASH. POST, Feb. II, 1998, at HI.
8 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
9 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
10 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993).
11 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First
Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1187 (1988) (stating that commercial speech "is not a central
theoretical concern of the First Amendment"); William Van Alstyne, Essay, Remembering Melville
Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on Commercial Speech, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1635, 1640 (1996)
(describing as "disconcerting" the idea that commercial speech be afforded equal First Amendment
treatment with other categories of speech); cf Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990) (noting that "the academic literature embraces
the [commercial-noncommercial] distinction wholeheartedly; professors take it as a given and then
devote their energies to disceming a principle to justify it, rather than the other way around").
12 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 123-24
(1993); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) (arguing for a broader
understanding of the freedom of speech).
13 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at xviii.
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Court properly treats as "low value."''
4
This Article contends that the contemporary judicial treatment of
advertising as "low value" speech is misplaced. The most obvious support
for this view that commercial speech should not be given second-class
status can be found in the text of the First Amendment itself. "Congress
shall make no law . . abridging the freedom of Speech, or of the Press."' 5
The fact that the text does not explicitly distinguish between
advertisements and other types of messages, of course, cannot end the
inquiry-the planning of a criminal conspiracy, for instance, is technically
"speech," but few would contend that such "speech" is protected under the
First Amendment. Rather, one must examine the original understanding of
the First Amendment to determine the categories of speech that will be
afforded constitutional protection. This Article argues that the colonial
history leading up to the passage of the First Amendment demonstrates
that the judiciary should subject government attempts to regulate
advertising content to the same searching inquiry that it employs in
assessing restrictions on other messages. As long as a commercial message
is truthful and concerns a lawful product or service-admittedly, key
qualifications-the government should not have any more power to restrict
that message than it does other, noncommercial messages.
This argument is of great practical importance. Americans have a
love-hate relationship with advertising. Although, as mentioned above,
many find advertising entertaining and informative, many others are highly
suspicious of advertising. Given the diminished constitutional protection
currently afforded commercial speech, advertising is therefore a frequent
target of regulators. To illustrate, both the most present and most recent
former chairmen of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have
urged the Commission to bar or severely to limit the advertising of spirits
on broadcast television.16
Further attempts to restrict commercial speech appear likely, as high-
profile attacks on advertising have recently come from both conservatives
and liberals. (It is often joked that liberals hate commercial speech because
14 The first step in any First Amendment inquiry is as to whether the speech is of "low
value," and therefore not deserving of full constitutional protection. See id. at 8-10. The Court has
designated several categories of speech for such "low value" treatment. See, e.g., New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (libel); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
(obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words). Although its
recent jurisprudence indicates that the Supreme Court has moved to a richer protection of commercial
speech than of some of these other "low value" categories, see infra Part IV.A, commercial speech is
nonetheless clearly not afforded full First Amendment protection-and thus remains of "low value"
under present law.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
16 See Sally Goll Beatty, Local Broadcasters Gingerly Study Options in Wake of Liquor
Repeal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B5; Bryan Gruley, New FCC Chief Shows Willingness to Aid
Firms Unable to Pay for PCS Licenses, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1997, at B II.
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it is commercial, and conservatives hate it because it is speech.) Thus, a
recent article in the conservative Weekly Standard called for a ban on
advertising of gambling, 17 and liberals have made a centerpiece of their
policy agenda attacks on the advertising of "unhealthy" products,
especially cigarettes. Some of these proposed limitations are quite
extreme. For example, among the many restrictions on tobacco
advertisements proposed by the Clinton Administration's Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is a bar on the use of color and pictures in tobacco
advertisements, except in a narrow class of adult publications, and a
complete ban of tobacco advertisements in media not pre-approved by the
FDA. 8
Furthermore, many proposals to ban billboards, tobacco, and alcohol
advertising, as well as "inappropriate" advertising are under consideration
or are being adopted at the state and local levels. These restrictions target
particular types of advertisements, and are therefore content-based. For
example, the City of Compton, California has banned cigarette and alcohol
advertising in "publicly visible location[s],"' 9 and San Francisco is
currently considering a comparable measure. 0 Similar measures have been
enacted or are being considered in communities around the country.
17 See David Tell, Wanna Bet?, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 15, 1997, at 11.
18 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897). These regulations are discussed in more detail infra at notes 285-92
and accompanying text.
19 Kevin O'Leary, Compton Bans Tobacco, Alcohol Billboards Ads, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1997, at B3.
20 See Edward Epstein, S.F. Moves to Extinguish Outdoor Tobacco Ads, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
10, 1997, at A17.
21 Many jurisdictions have recently enacted restrictions on outdoor tobacco and alcohol
advertising. See, e.g., Fran Spielman, Billboards Get Smoked, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 10, 1997, at I
(Chicago, Ill.); Caroline Y. Ullmann, Group Wants All-Out War on Smoking, MORNING NEWS TRIB.,
Jan. 15, 1997, at AI (Tacoma, Wash.); Thaai Walker, Oakland Council OKs Limits on Alcohol,
Tobacco Billboards, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 4, 1997, at A24 (Oakland, Cal.). Milwaukee is currently
considering adopting similar restrictions. See Mike Nichols, Kalwitz Seeks Limits on Alcohol, Tobacco
Ads, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 30, 1997, at 3. Billboard advertising of tobacco has been restricted
in Baltimore. See Eric Siegel and Joanna Daemmrich, Council Favors Restrictions on Tobacco
Billboards, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. I, 1994, at 2B. Similar measures are being considered in other cities
as well. See, e.g., Robert Farley, Proposal to Ban Some Billboards Spurs City Debate, HARRISBURG
PATRIOT, Oct. 30, 1997, at B5 (Harrisburg, Pa.); Hawke Fracassa, In Macomb County: Warren
Considers Tobacco Proposal, DET. NEWS, Dec. 2, 1997, at C5 (Warren, Mich.); Mayor Wants to
Impose Ban on Tobacco Billboards, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 14, 1997, at 4B (Springfield,
Miss.). The New York City Council has passed a measure (not yet approved by the mayor) that would
prohibit tobacco advertising within 1000 feet of schools, playgrounds, daycares, and other "children's
institutions." See Vivian S. Toy, City Council Votes Strict Legislation on Cigarette Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1997, at A6. Other cities have enacted or are considering enacting ordinances similar to the
New York measure. See, e.g., Josh Meyer, Ban OK'd on Cigarette Billboards, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23,
1997, at BI (Los Angeles and Los Angeles County, Cal.); Caroline Y. Ullmann, Group Wants All-Out
War on Smoking, MORNING NEWS TRIB., Jan. 15, 1997, at Al (Seattle-King County, Wash.); Winifred
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Other proposals would give the government power to make judgments
about the content of advertisements and would be clearly impermissible if
applied to non-commercial messages. To illustrate, the New York City
Metropolitan Transit Authority recently promulgated regulations
prohibiting advertisements that are "offensive or in bad taste" to a
"significant segment of the public" or are "harmful to the morale" of the
transit authority's employees.2 Thus, the question of whether the First
Amendment bars many of these proposed regulations has enormous
practical significance, for our politics as well as for the functioning of our
market economy.
Part I of this Article sets forth the strong historical evidence
demonstrating that commercial advertising was a critical part of the press
that the Framers wanted to remain forever free. It shows that treating
advertisements as encompassed within "the freedom of the press" is
consistent with the Framers' political philosophy, which equated liberty
and property. This Part also demonstrates that advertising was not only
ubiquitous in colonial America, but also played an indispensable role in
the development of the American free press, which included, and relied on,
advertising. Furthermore, the history of the First Amendment, which was
adopted in part to bar stamp acts that directly taxed advertising, also
supports affording truthful commercial speech about lawful products or
services full protection from government regulation. Finally, Part I shows
that the practices of state legislatures at the time the Bill of Rights was
ratified further support the view that the Framers did not consider
commercial speech to be of "low value"; in an era of extensive commercial
regulation, the only restrictions on advertising concerned the promotion of
unlawful activities, such as lotteries or horse racing.
Part II demonstrates that this robust American tradition of free
commercial speech continued through the Civil War and the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as advertising grew essentially unchecked and
unregulated throughout the nineteenth century. Although the number of
states and statutes increased, advertising continued to be barred only where
it was used to publicize unlawful products, services, or activities. The
Supreme Court's treatment of truthful advertising during and immediately
after Reconstruction was indistinguishable from the treatment accorded
other forms of speech.
Part III identifies the source of the Supreme Court's present
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. While the
Progressive Era witnessed both an increase in the power of advertising and
more political and popular attempts to limit its influence, those efforts
22 STANDARDS FOR ADVERTISING § (a)(axiv), (a)(x) (New York City Metro. Transit Auth.
1997).
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overwhelmingly focused on ensuring that advertising was truthful and
nonmisleading. During this period, however, courts began analyzing
constraints on commercial speech under the rubric of substantive due
process-an ultimately discredited notion that much economic regulation
violated the Constitution's Due Process Clause. This confusion of
categories-commercial speech should have been treated as a First
Amendment issue-led the Supreme Court to declare in 1942 that
restrictions on advertising were purely economic regulations. Because the
Court did not treat advertising as protected speech, subsequent restrictions
on advertising were not subjected to any special constitutional scrutiny and
were routinely upheld.
In light of this historical background, Part IV discusses and analyzes
the Court's current commercial speech jurisprudence. It chronicles how, in
the 1970s, driven in part by opposition to limits on advertisements for
abortions, the Supreme Court began extending a measure of constitutional
protection to commercial speech. This development culminated in a 1976
Supreme Court decision explicitly recognizing that advertising served
consumer interests and was entitled to partial constitutional protection,23
the meaning of which was clarified four years later in Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.14 Part IV
argues that, although this trend in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
generally been supportive of the right to advertise, a lack of clarity
continues to mark the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under Central
Hudson. Accordingly, the Article concludes by suggesting that the Court
should abandon the balancing test set forth in Central Hudson, and
embrace the First Amendment interpretation compelled by the historical
evidence: that government attempts to restrict truthful commercial
messages about lawful products and services should be subject to the same
searching review currently employed in assessing attempts to restrict or
limit the content of other types of speech, including speech about political
ideas.
I. The Colonial Understanding of the Importance of Commercial
Speech
Perhaps paradoxically, exploring the eighteenth-century approach to
advertising can help bring clarity to a pressing late twentieth-century
problem-i.e., what role should the government play in regulating
advertising? As a matter of constitutional law, it is of critical importance
that we understand whether the generation of the Framers believed the
23 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976),
24 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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First Amendment to protect commercial speech; furthermore, as a broader
matter it may be illuminating to explore the principles animating colonial
Americans' defense of a vibrant commercial press. This Part sets forth
strong evidence showing that the generation of the Framers believed the
right to advertise to be encompassed within "the freedom of the press"
protected by the First Amendment. This conclusion follows from an
examination of the property-based view of liberty held by the Framing
generation, particularly James Madison; the ubiquitous presence of
advertising in the colonial era, which demonstrates that the free exchange
of commercial information was both the financial means and an
independent end sustaining the nascent American press; and the reactions
of defenders of a free press to restrictions on speech during the pre-
Revolutionary period.
This Part also shows that state legislative practices at the time of the
First Amendment's ratification confirm the conclusion that truthful
advertising about lawful products was understood by the Framers to be
within "the freedom of the press." The sole restrictions on the right to
advertise at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights involved limits
on messages which either advertised products or activities that we'e illegal
or conveyed demonstrably false information. The evidence suggests that
the generation of the Framers, rather than distinguishing between speech
with political and commercial content, distinguished instead between
patently false speech and speech that was either truthful or not subject to
an assessment of its veracity.
A. The First Amendment's Orientation Towards the Protection of
Property
Professor John McGinnis notes that in seventeenth and eighteenth
century England there were two reigning justifications for free expression:
the idea that free speech "was an instrument to some collective good" and
the notion that free speech was a "natural property right of the
individual." 25 This latter justification, he shows, "dramatically influenced
the framing of the Constitution. 26 McGinnis explains that:
The seeds of a property-centered First Amendment were blown across
the Atlantic in three separate vessels. First, the two English episodes that
were most renowned in the colonies as victories for freedom of the
press-the termination of licensing laws and the denial of government
power to seize written materials under general warrant-were both
25 John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49,58 (1996).
26 Id. at 59.
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justified on property-rights grounds. Second, the essays on the theory of
government most widely read in the colonies saw liberty and property
rights as essentially indivisible. Finally, the most sophisticated
philosophical defense of the Whig theory of government and the primacy
of property rights, namely John Locke's Second Treatise on Government,
provided direct theoretical inspiration to James Madison-the drafter of
the First Amendment.
27
In this Whig tradition, freedom of speech and property rights were seen as
essential parts of an individual's liberty, 2 an understanding derived from
the philosophical writings of John Locke, who defined the "state of perfect
freedom" as the ability of people "to order their actions and dispose of
their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the
law of nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of any
other man.,
29
The libertarian Cato's Letters, published from 1720 to 1723 and
widely circulated in the colonies,3° drew on Locke in equating explicitly
liberty and property. Cato wrote:
By liberty, I understand the power which every man has over his own
actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit of his labour, art, and industry, as
so far as by it he hurts not the society, or any members of it, by taking
from any member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself
enjoys. 31
Applying this view to the freedom of expression, Cato articulated the
importance of free speech and its inextricable link with property rights:
"This sacred privilege is so essential to free government, that the security
of property; and the freedom of speech, always go together; and in those
wretched countries where a man cannot call his tongue his own, he can
scarce call anything else his own. 3 2
Cato's articulation of the tie between property rights and free speech
was enormously influential in colonial America.33 According to Clinton
Rossiter, Cato's Letters was "the most popular, quotable, esteemed source
27 Id. at 59-60.
28 See id. at 63.
29 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 4 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Bobbs-Merrill 1st ed. 17th prtg. 1975) (1690).
30 See CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 141 (1953).
31 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, I CATO'S LETTERS 427 (Ronald Hamow ed.,
Liberty Classics ed. 1995) (1720-23).
32 Id. at 110 (Essay No. 15, Of Freedom of Speech: That the Same is Inseparable From
Publick Liberty, Feb. 4, 1720).
33 See JEFFREY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY
AMERICAN JOURNALISM 25 (1988).
94
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of political ideas in the colonial period., 34 This influence is reflected in the
comment of one newspaper commentator, who wrote that "Liberty and
Property are not only join'd in common discourse, but are in their own
natures so nearly ally'd that we cannot be said to possess the one without
the enjoyment of the other."" In fact, Cato's Essay on Free Speech,36 first
printed in America by Benjamin Franklin,37 contained the seed of the First
Amendment's Press Clause.
James Madison, who drafted the First Amendment, essentially
regarded all rights, including the right of free speech, as a form of property
right shielded from government interference. Echoing Locke and Cato,
Madison wrote:
In its larger and juster meaning, [property] embraces every thing to
which a man may attach a value and have right; and which leaves to
every one else the like advantage.
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize, or money is
called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and the free
communication of them. 38
Furthermore, in Madison's view, the primary role of government was to
guarantee these rights-including the right to free speech-to the
individual: "Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the
term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that alone
is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is
his own.",3 9 Thus, the drafter of the First Amendment, like many others in
colonial America, firmly believed in the tie between liberty and property.
Providing further evidence of this common linkage of liberty and property
was the Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted by George Mason, which
stated that among the natural rights of man was "the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing
and obtaining happiness and safety. 40
This preeminent emphasis on property rights strongly suggests that,
contrary to the views of Sunstein and others, colonial Americans viewed
34 ROSSITIER, supra note 30, at 141.
35 BOSTON NEWSLETTER, February 16, 1772, quoted in ROSSITER, supra note 30, at 379.
36 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 31, at 110-17.
37 See LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 3 (1996).
38 James Madison, Property, THE NATIONAL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in JAMES
MADISON, 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (Robert A. Rutland et. al. eds., 1983) (1792)
(second emphasis added).
39 Id.
40 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § I (Va. 1776).
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the First Amendment as protecting far more than just political speech. As
one contributor writing under the pseudonym "Philalethes" declared in
Boston's Herald of Freedom in 1788, Americans "are nurtured in the
ennobling idea that to think what they please, and to speak, write and
publish their sentiments with decency and independency on every subject,
constitutes the dignified character of Americans., 41 The theoretical
emphasis placed by colonial Americans on property rights set forth in this
Section indicates that commercial matters were to be counted among the
"subjects" to which the freedom of speech obtained. As Richard Henry
Lee of Virginia, perhaps the leading Anti-Federalist, said in his demand
for a bill of rights, "A free press is the channel of communication as to
mercantile and public affairs., 42 As will be explained in the following
Section, colonial Americans' abstract commitment to a free commercial
press coincided with a vibrant practical tradition of commercial speech.
B. The History ofAdvertising in Colonial America
1. The British Model of Speech Regulation
The Framers and their contemporaries were well aware of the history
of press repression in the "mother" country. England's seditious libel
laws-which had subjected critics of the Crown to criminal punishment-
and ecclesiastical bans on heresy predated the spread of the printing
press.43 Predictably, the English government considered the printing press
a serious threat to its power. This technological breakthrough threatened
the government's practice of limiting dissent by denying individuals
access to information.44
Rather than directly barring the new technology, however, English
authorities sought more subtle controls: government licensing and
taxation. For almost 200 years, the English licensing system ensured that
the Crown's agents reviewed all printed material before distribution.45
Printers were forced to post large bonds to acquire a license. These bonds
were subject to forfeiture if a printer published material critical of
41 BOSTON HERALD OF FREEDOM, Sept. 15, 1788, quoted in SMITH, supra note 33, at 19
(emphasis added). Similarly, among the reasons given by the Continental Congress to settlers in
Quebec in 1774 for the importance of the freedom of the press, was "the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and arts in general." Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec (1774), in I BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 223 (1971).
42 Letter XVI, Jan. 20, 1788, in AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 151-53 (1962) (emphasis added).
43 See FREDRICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND: 1476-1776, at 42, 380-
81 (1952).
44 See id. at 41-63.
45 See id.
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government authorities. Those who published without permission faced
fines and imprisonment. Moreover, even after the licensing system was
jettisoned in 1694 in response to objections by Whig printers, the
government used taxes to choke off newspapers by driving up their costs.
46
The express purpose of Britain's first Stamp Act in 1712 was to control
"licentious, schismatical, and scandalous" publications.
47
English-style restraints on the press were exported to colonial
America in the form of taxation.48 The slow rate of American newspaper
development in the 1600s, however, was attributable not to government
intervention, but rather to two structural impediments: a minimal interest
in "news" beyond that already satisfied by the English papers and a lack of
means for funding press operations.49 American newspapers began to
emerge only as colonial business and industry, particularly shipbuilding
and ocean commerce, began to grow.5° As small industries developed a
need to inform the public of their wares, printers began publishing
newspapers to spread that information. Thus, advertising was both a major
impetus and means for establishing regularly published newspapers in
colonial America. Nevertheless, the English system of suppression of free
speech remained in place as the American press began to develop.
2. Advertising in Colonial America
As one commentator has observed, "Well before 1800 most English
and American newspapers were not only supported by advertising but they
were, even primarily, vehicles for the dissemination of advertising. ''51 The
development of a free press and of a commercial, advertising-driven press
were inextricably linked. In his introduction to Benjamin Franklin's
Letters to the Press, 1758-1775, Verner W. Crane noted, "It was a
,,52commercial age, and [it] produced a commercial press.
The majority of the advertisements which appeared in colonial
51
newspapers would be considered "commercial speech" today, messagesthat propose a commercial transaction.54 As commercial speech scholar
46 See id. at 306-22.
47 Id. at 309 (quoting the first Stamp Act, 1712, 10 Anne, ch. 18 (Eng.)).
48 See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace
of Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 263-64 (1985) (discussing the taxation of the American press during the
1700s).
49 See EDWIN EMERY & MICHAEL EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 18 (1978).
50 See id. at 19.
51 JAMES PLAYSTED WOOD, THE STORY OF ADVERTISING 85 (1958).
52 Verner W. Crane, Introduction to BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S LETTERS TO THE PRESS, 1758-
1775, at xi, xvi (Verner W. Crane ed., 1950).
53 See Kent R. Middleton, Commercial Speech in the Eighteenth Century, in NEWSLETTERS
TO NEWSPAPERS: EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY JOURNALISM 277, 282 (Donovan H. Bond & W. Reynolds
McLeod eds., 1977).
54 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
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Kent R. Middleton noted, "The colonial press regularly carried reputable
medical advertisements, as well as those for books, cloth, empty bottles,
corks, and other useful goods and services." 5  Without these
advertisements, the colonial press so important to the Revolutionary cause
would almost certainly have been less vibrant, if it would have existed at
all. Frank Mott, in his classic history of journalism, notes that during the
eighteenth century, like today, "[a]dvertising represented the chief profit
margin in the newspaper business. 56 As a source of information to the
population at large, as well as a source of income to the colonial printers
who played such an integral role in the struggle for freedom, advertising
was both influential and plentiful during the latter part of the colonial era.
Among the goals of the first attempted colonial newspaper, entitled
Publick Occurrences, Both Foreign and Domestick, which appeared in
1690, was the promotion of "Businesses and Negotiations. 5 ' The
inaugural issue of the first successful American newspaper, the Boston
Newsletter, published on April 24, 1704, contained the following
solicitation: "This News-Letter is to be continued Weekly, and all Persons
who have Houses, Lands, Tenements, Farms, Ships, Vessels, Goods,
Wares or Merchandise, &c to be Sold or Let; or Servants Run-Away, or
Goods Stole or Lost; may have the same inserted at a Reasonable Rate." '58
The next week's issue of the Boston Newsletter contained paid entries that
sought the return of two lost anvils, offered a bounty for capturing a thief,
and listed a "very good Fulling Mill to be Let or Sold" in Oyster Bay, New
York.59
Although paid advertising first appeared in the Boston Newsletter,6 °
as Presbrey reports, it took about fifteen years for Benjamin Franklin and
his brother James to come "into journalism and sow[ ] the seed of a free
press and an expansion of advertising." 6' Franklin not only sold
advertising to support his publishing efforts, he also advertised in his own
newspapers to promote the goods he sold in his Philadelphia shop. An
early biographer of Ben Franklin credits him with having "originated the
modern system of advertising. '63 In advertising his "Pennsylvania
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
55 Middleton, supra note 53, at 282.
56 FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM-A HISTORY OF NEWSPAPERS IN THE
UNITED STATES THROUGH 250 YEARS: 1690-1960, at 56 (3d ed. 1963).
57 PUBLICK OCCURRENCES, BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTICK, Sept. 25, 1690, at 1, quoted
in FRANK PRESBREY, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADVERTISING 119 (1929).
58 BOSTON NEWSLETTER, Apr. 24, 1704, quoted in WOOD supra note 51, at 45.
59 Id., quoted in WOOD supra note 51, at 45-46.
60 See supra note 57-59 and accompanying text.
61 PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 131; see also MOTT, supra note 56, 11-16.
62 See WOOD, supra note 51, at 48-49.
63 JAMES PARTON, LIFE AND TIMES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (1864), reprinted in WOOD,
supra note 5 I, at 48.
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Fireplace" (now known as the Franklin stove), Franklin showed himself to
be a consummate pitchman in extolling its virtues over those of an open
fireplace: "Great and bright fires do also very much contribute to
damaging the eyes, dry and shrivel the skin, and bring on the early
appearance of old age."64
When the New-Hampshire Gazette was launched in 1756, its
publisher said that the paper would
contain Extracts from the best Authors on Points of the most useful
Knowledge, moral, religious, or political Essays, and such other
Speculations as may have a Tendency to improve the Mind, afford any
Help to Trade, Manufactures, Husbandry, and other useful Arts, and
promote the public Welfare in any Respect.
65
True to its word, the Gazette, like the other newspapers of its day, carried
everything from price lists to political philosophy.66 Often, more than half
of the standard colonial newspaper was taken up by advertising. In 1766,
70% of Hugh Gaine's New- York Mercury consisted of advertising.
67
The first daily newspaper in the United States was established in 1784
primarily as a medium for advertising. When the Pennsylvania Packet and
General Advertiser initially appeared, ten of its sixteen columns were
filled with advertisements. 6' The name of this paper (as well as that of
New York's first daily, The New-York Daily Advertiser), reflected the
common understanding that commercial advertisements were as much a
part of the news of the day (and the purpose of the press) as reports of
government activity. The front pages of the Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia newspapers were devoted almost exclusively to advertising.69
Indeed, as Mott reports, "Most dailies in these years used page one for
advertising, sometimes saving only one column of it for reading matter."7 0
Also, for much of the colonial era, newspapers did not use layout
techniques or differences in typeface to provide a visual distinction
between the two; they were regarded as of equal interest to readers and
treated the same.7' As advertising historian Frank Presbrey observed:
64 WOOD, supra note 51, at 51.
65 NEW HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, October 7, 1756, quoted in SMITH, supra note 33, at 49
(emphasis added).
66 See LAWRENCE C. WROTH, THE COLONIAL PRINTER 234 (1938).
67 See A. LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER IN AMERICA 32 (1937).
68 See PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 16 1.
69 See MOTT, supra note 56, at 157; see also WOOD, supra note 51, at 85.
70 MOTT, supra note 56, at 157.
71 See Middleton, supra note 53, at 281. This also may have been as a result of the
technology available at the time.
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Advertisements had as much interest as the news columns, perhaps
greater interest, for they were more intimately connected with the
readers' daily life than were the foreign items that made up so large a
part of the news. Arrival of a new cargo of food or drink, or tools, likely
was what the man, home from a reading at the coffee house or tavern,
talked about at his fireside rather than the reception of a new envoy at
some court in Europe.
72
In light of the importance of advertising to colonial Americans,
attempts by modem constitutional scholars to treat commercial speech as
"low value" seem peculiar. Advertisements were necessary to the colonial
press not only because the revenue they generated was required for
newspapers to exist; they were also thought to have independent value in
educating and informing the reading public. As the prominent printer-
historian Isaiah Thomas, editor of an ardently pro-Revolutionary
newspaper, wrote, "[A]dvertisements are well calculated to enlarge and
enlighten the public mind, and are worthy of being enumerated among the
many methods of awakening and maintaining the popular attention, with
which more modem times, beyond all preceding example, abound.
73
In fact, one of the best-known statements in defense of a free press-
Franklin's famous Apology for Printers74 -was written in response to an
attack on an advertisement printed by Franklin. In 1731, Franklin printed a
politically incorrect advertising notice for a ship's captain. The
advertisement was not part of a newspaper; it was distributed as a stand-
alone commercial handbill. The paper simply proposed a commercial
transaction by seeking additional freight and passengers for the captain's
ship. At the bottom of the advertisement was the note, "No Sea Hens nor
Black Gowns will be admitted on any Terms. ' 75
72 PRESBEY, supra note 57, at 154. As an interesting aside, advertising also played a role in
the lives of individuals who helped found the republic. For example, to attract settlers to his land
holdings in Ohio, George Washington advertised in the July 15, 1773, Maryland Advocate and
Commercial Advertiser and in a September issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette. See WOOD, supra note
51, at 67. He also wrote a letter to Major General Henry Knox of New York asking him to obtain
"superfine American Broad Cloths" to outfit himself and his wife, which he had learned about "from
an Advertisement in the New York Daily Advertiser." Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox
(Jan. 29, 1789), reprinted in id. at 69.
73 HISTORY OF PRINTING IN AMERICA WITH A BIOGRAPHY OF PRINTERS, AND AN ACCOUNT
OF NEWSPAPERS (1810), quoted in D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 328
(1958). Justice Blackmun echoed these words nearly two centuries later in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), stating that "It is a matter
of public interest that [private economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable." Id. at 765.
74 An Apology for Printers (1731), reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 172,
(Albert Henry Smith ed., 1907).
75 Id. at 176.
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This handbill outraged the local clergy (the "Black Gowns"),
although it is unclear whether they were more offended by their exclusion
from the pool of desirable passengers or from their placement in the same
category as women of ill repute ("Sea Hens"). In response to attacks on the
advertisement, Benjamin Franklin published his Apology for Printers
which, according to one later commentator, was at that time, "[b]y far the
best known and most sustained colonial argument for an impartial press. ' 6
Originally published in the June 10, 1731, edition of the Pennsylvania
Gazette, Franklin's Apology contended that "Printers are educated in the
Belief that when Men differ in opinion, both Sides ought equally to have
the Advantage of being heard by the Publick. 'T
To Franklin, even those "opinions" in advertisements should be
"heard by the Publick." Thus, America's first sustained defense of a free
press, and of the very notion of a "marketplace of ideas," came in response
to an attack on a classic example of commercial speech.
C. Colonial and Post-Revolutionary Regulations on Speech
1. The Stamp Acts-Free Commercial Speech as a Revolutionary
Impetus
Given the eighteenth-century equation of liberty and property,
printers who published advertising-laden newspapers were generally
understood to be exercising the natural right to control their property.
Indeed, one of the major precipitating events of the American Revolution
involved a defense of advertisements. Much of the opposition to the
British Stamp Act of 1765 and the taxes it imposed on the press was based
on their perceived offense to property rights-as well as to freedom of the
78press.
The Stamp Act assessed a half-penny tax on each copy of newspaper
printed on what was called "half a sheet"; a penny was assessed on the
next larger size.79 The Act then added 2 shillings for each advertisement.
As Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. writes, "[B]y any standard [this amount] was
excessive, since the publisher himself received only from 3 to 5s. and still
less for repeated insertions." 80 This tax galvanized the colonial press
76 S. Botein, Printers and the American Revolution, in THE PRESS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 20 (B. Bailyn & J.B. Hench eds., 1980).
. 77 An Apology for Printers, reprinted in WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, supra note 75,
at 174.
78 See Middleton, supra note 53, at 280-81.
79 See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, SR., PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE: THE NEWSPAPER WAR ON
BRITAIN 1764-1776, at 68 (1966).
80 Id.
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against the British government, leading one commentator of the day to
note, "Stamp duties also, imposed on every commercial instrument of
writing-on literary productions, and, particularly, on newspapers, which
of course, will be a great discouragement to trade; an obstruction to useful
knowledge in arts, sciences, agriculture, and manufactures; and a
prevention of political information throughout the states.'
The opposition of newspapers to the Stamp Act of 1765 was based
largely, if not primarily, on their concern that it encroached on the freedom
of expression. 2 In reacting to the Stamp Act, the Town of Worcester
directed its representatives in the Massachusetts Assembly to "take special
care of the LIBERTY OF THE PRESS." 3 The Connecticut Gazette
enjoined its readers that "[t]he press is the test of truth, the bulwark of
public safety, the guardian of freedom, and the people ought not to
sacrifice it."'84 The New York Gazette or Weekly Post-Boy flaunted the
motto: "The United Voice of all His Majesty's free and loyal subjects in
America-LIBERTY, PROPERTY, and no STAMPS. ' 5 According to
Presbrey, the repeal of the Stamp Act of 1765 one year after it had been
enacted "was a powerful victory for an independent press and for
advertising."
86
After the Revolution, and only five years after adopting a state
constitution explicitly guaranteeing freedom of the press, 87 Massachusetts
enacted a similar stamp tax on all newspapers and almanacs. 88 This act was
followed by a tax on newspaper advertisements8 9 These taxes were widely
denounced both within and outside of the state as, in printer Isaiah
Thomas's words, an "unconstitutional restraint on the Liberty of the
Press."90 Repeal of the advertising tax in 1786 was also cited as a triumph
for freedom of the press.9'
81 Objections by A Son of Liberty, NEW YORK J., Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 6 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 34, 36 (Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981).
82 See SCHLESINGER, supra note 79, at 70-82.
83 Id. at 70.
84 CONN. GAZETTE, quoted in id.
85 N.Y. GAZETTE or WKLY POST-BOY, Nov. 7, 1765, quoted in id. at 77.
86 PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 151.
87 See DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. XVI (Mass. 1780).
88 See Neisser, supra note 48, at 264 (citing CLYDE A. DUNIWAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS 136 (1966)).
89 See id.
90 Isaiah Thomas, ESSEX J., Apr. 19, 1786, and MASS. GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 1786, quoted in
Carol S. Humphrey, "That Bulwark of Our Liberties ": Massachusetts Printers and the Issue of a Free
Press, 1783-1788, 14 JOURNALISM HIST. 34, 37 (1987).
91 See id.; see also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248 (1936) (noting that
the then recent Massachusetts episode played a part in the Framers' adoption of the First Amendment).
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2. State Regulation of Commercial Speech at the Time of the
Framing
Early Americans were not only hostile to taxes imposing upon
commercial speech; they also appear to have been averse to any
government regulation on the advertising of legal products. The practices
of state legislatures around the time the First Amendment was ratified
further support this Article's conclusion that the generation of the Framers
did not distinguish between the constitutional status of commercial and
noncommercial speech.92 A thorough review of the state codes at that time
indicates that states, in fact, did not restrict commercial messages about
lawful products or services.93 Rather, consistent with the constitutions of
the ten states that explicitly protected the freedom of the press,94
advertising was limited only when used to promote products, services, or
activities that were themselves unlawful.
Although much trade regulation existed at the time of the Framing,
there were apparently no restrictions on the advertising of lawful activities.
92 Article I of the Constitution delegated limited powers to the federal government; all other
powers were reserved to the people and the states. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X. The First Amendment
explicitly limited Congress's authority over speech and the press. As such, it is unlikely that the federal
government was granted greater power to restrict speech than existed in the states. It is therefore
instructive to examine state legislative and constitutional authority to assess the limits of the power
delegated to Congress. The fact that, as discussed below, state legislatures did not regulate truthful
advertising of lawful products and services suggests, at a minimum, that such a power was not
delegated to the federal government. The lack of such regulation, although not dispositive, also
suggests that advertising was regarded as within "the freedom of speech and of the press" protected by
many state constitutions.
93 This conclusion rests upon a review of the compilations of ratification-era statutes for
each state closest in date to 1791. THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (1808);
LAWS OF MARYLAND (1811); THE LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM
NOVEMBER 28, 1780 TO FEBRUARY 23, 1807 (1807); THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
(1797); THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (1800); LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1802);
THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1804); DIGEST OF THE ACTS OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA (1841); THE PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1798); THE PUBLIC LAW OF THE STATE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA (1790); LAWS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT (1797); COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA (1803). All compilations are available at The Edward Bennett
Williams Law Library, Georgetown University Law Center. Contemporaneous compilations for
Delaware and Georgia were unavailable.
94 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 23 (Del. 1776); GA. CONST. OF 1798 art. IV, § V;
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 38 (Md. 1776); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. XVI (Mass. 1780);
BILL OF RIGHTS art. 22 (N.H. 1783); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 25 (NC. 1776); DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS para. 12 (Pa. 1776); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 7 (S.C. 1778); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
ch. 1, art. XIII (Vt. .1793); DECLARATION OF RIGHTS para. 12 (Va. 1776). Two of those states-
Pennsylvania and Vermont-connected that provision to protection for freedom of speech. See
generally David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 441
n.55 (1983). Of the remaining four states in existence when the Bill of Rights was ratified, two-
Rhode Island and Connecticut-had not drafted state constitutions; two others-New York and New
Jersey-did not provide specific state constitutional guarantees of freedom of press and speech. See
LEONARD A. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 189 (1985).
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Early statutes show efforts to regulate merchants and shopkeepers," liquor
and taverns, 96 potash, 97 malt,98 a variety of commodities,99 attorneys, 00 and
doctors.' 0' Among other things, these statutes required licenses, prevented
charging of "unreasonable prices," and set standards for inspection and
weighing of commodities. The statutes surveyed, however, reveal no
restrictions on the right of these regulated industries to advertise lawful
products and services. Sellers were left to their own creativity in seeking to
attract attention to their wares. And buyers were protected against
potentially false or misleading claims by the common law, tempered by the
doctrine of caveat emptor-let the buyer beware.'0 2
The sole limitations placed on advertising restricted the promotion of
certain prohibited activities. For example, during the period surrounding
the ratification of the Bill of Rights, numerous states prohibited or
restricted lotteries. Several statutes that barred or restricted lotteries
specifically prohibited their advertisement and promotion.'0 3 New Jersey,
95 See. e.g., Act for Punishing and Preventing Oppression, 1635 (amended 1730), THE
PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF CONNECTICUT 544 (1808).
96 See. e.g., Act Regulating Licensed Houses, 1791, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE 373-76 (1797); Act to Lay A Duty on Strong Liquors, and For Regulating Inns and
Taverns, 1801, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 439-43 (1802); Act for Regulating Ordinaries,
Houses of Entertainment and Retailers of Spirituous Liquors, 1798, THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 122-23 (1804).
97 See, e.g., Act to Regulate the Exportation of Potash and Pearl Ash, 1792, THE LAWS OF
MARYLAND 191-92 (1811); Act to Regulate Flax-Feed, Pot-ash and Pearl Ash for Exportation, 1785,
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 377-79 (1797).
98 See. e.g., Act for the Better Making and Measuring of Malt, 1700, THE LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 186 (1807).
99 See, e.g., Act for Regulating the Exportation of Tobacco and Butter, and the Weight of
Onions in Bunches, and the Size of Lime-Casks, 1785, THE LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 320-23 (1807); Act to Prevent Frauds and Deceits in Selling Rice, Pitch, Tar, Rosin,
Turpentine, Beef, Pork, Shingles, Stoves and Fire-wood, and to Regulate the Weighing of the
Merchandise in this Province, 1746, THE PUBLIC LAW OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 208-10
(1790).
100 See, e.g., Act Regulating the Admission of Attomies, 1785, THE LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 318-19 (1785).
101 See, e.g., Act to Regulate the Practice of Physic and Surgery, 1783, LAWS OF THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY 7-8 (1783).
102 See, e.g., Borrekins v. Bevan, 3 Rawle 23, 37 (Pa. 1831) ("A sample, or description in a
sale note, advertisement, bill of parcels, or invoice, is equivalent to an express warranty, that the goods
are what they are described"). See generally Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor,
40 YALE L. REV. 1133 (1931).
103 See, e.g., Act for the Prevention of Lotteries, 1792, THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 189-90
(1811) (prohibiting lotteries, as well as their "propos[al] to the public," absent permission of the
legislature); Act for the Suppression of Lotteries, 1785, THE LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS 252-53 (1807) (providing separate fines for setting up lottery and "aiding and
assisting in any such lottery, by printing, writing, or in any other manner publishing an account thereof,
or where the tickets may be had"); Act for the Suppressing of Lotteries, 1791, THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 339 (1805) (separate penalties for setting up a lottery and "aiding or
assisting ... by printing, or any other ways publishing an account thereof," except as established by
the state of Congress); Act to Prevent Private Lotteries, to remit certain Penalties, and to Repeal the
Acts therein Mentioned, 1783, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 35-38 (1802) (providing penalties
for being in "any ways concerned" with lotteries not authorized by the state, including "printing,
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for example, enacted a statute in 1797 declaring that, except for lotteries
established under the authority of the United States or the New Jersey
legislature, "all lotteries for money, goods, wares ... or other matters or
things whatsoever, shall be, and hereby are adjudged to be common and
public nuisances."' 0 4  With respect to unauthorized-and therefore
illegal-lotteries, the act imposed separate penalties on those who "make
or draw" such lotteries, as well as those who print, write or publish any
account of where tickets are available, or who "expose to public view, any
...advertisement or advertisements of or concerning such lottery.
1 °5
Only Pennsylvania completely outlawed lotteries (and their
advertisement). 0 6
A handful of states prevented the advertisement of other illegal
activities. For example, Connecticut and Pennsylvania prohibited the
staging-and advertising-of horse racing.107 And Rhode Island
prohibited the erection of a sign "for the keeping of a public house"
without first obtaining an innkeeper's license.
108
In fact, a review of statutes existing at the time of the Framing
demonstrates not only that state legislatures were not hostile to commercial
speech, but also that they were aware of advertising and its potential
usefulness. On certain occasions, state legislatures required advertising as
a means of disseminating information necessary to protect the property or
legal rights of others.'0 9 The state legislatures, therefore, were not opposed
to advertising in general; that advertising was a tool employed by the state
legislatures indicates that they appreciated its value.
writing, or any other ways publishing an account thereof'); Act for Suppressing and Preventing of
Private Lotteries, 1762, THE PUBLIC LAW OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 256-67 (1790) (fining
anyone "who shall make, writ, print or publish, or cause to be written or published, any scheme or
proposal" for a private lottery).
104 Act of Feb. 13, § 1, 1797, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 227-28 (1800).
105 Id. § 3.
106 See Act for the More Effectual Suppressing and Preventing of Lotteries, 1762, A DIGEST
OF THE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA 584-85 (1841) (setting 201 fine for,
inter alia, advertising or causing to be advertised any lottery).
107 See Act to Prevent Horse Racing, 1803, THE PUBLIC STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT 381-82 (1808); Act Against Horse Racing, 1820, A DIGEST OF THE ACTS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA 450-51 (1841).
108 See Act Enabling the Town-Councils of Each Town In This State to Grant Licenses for
Retailing Strong Liquors, and to Prevent the Selling of the Same without License, and against the
Keeping of Signs at Unlicensed Houses, 1728, THE PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 391-94 (1798).
109 See, e.g., Act for Amending, and Reducing into System, the Laws and Regulations
Concerning Last Wills and Testaments, the Duties of executors, Administrators and Guardians, and the
Rights of Orphans and Other Representatives of Deceased Persons, 1798, LAWS OF MARYLAND 457-
60 (1811) (executors of estates were not liable for claims made after one year, if they inserted an
advertisement announcing the estate in newspapers designated by the Orphans' Court); Act Relating to
Deserters, 1741, PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 64 (1804) (requiring
the jailer of a runaway slave to advertise, at the cost of the rightful owner, in the Virginia or South
Carolina Gazette).
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3. Common Law Exceptions to Free Commercial Speech: Fraud,
Libel, and Solicitation
Although the evidence in the preceding section strongly suggests that
advertising was within the freedom of the press meant to be protected by
the First Amendment, a key qualification must be made to this statement.
The First Amendment was adopted against the background of a venerable
common law tradition prohibiting commercial misrepresentation. In the
words of Sir William Blackstone, "[E]very kind of fraud is equally
cognizable ... in a court of law."'" 0 Thus, false or misleading commercial
speech is clearly not entitled to First Amendment protection.l11
Justice Joseph Story's treatise Equity Jurisprudence addressed that
"old head of equity," the law of misrepresentation, in great detail." 2 He
described the basic rule as follows:
Where the party intentionally, or by design, misrepresents a material fact,
or produces a false impression, in order to mislead another, or to entrap
or to cheat him, or to obtain an undue advantage of him; in every sense
there is a positive fraud in the truest sense of the terms; there is an evil
act with evil intent .... And the misrepresentation may be as well by
deeds or acts, as by words; by artifices to mislead, as well as by positive
assertions. 113
That liability could accompany this category of speech demonstrates that it
was outside the bounds of speech that the Framing generation deemed
deserving of constitutional protection.
In further support of this exception, there is little evidence that
demonstrably false speech was considered to be within "the freedom of
speech" contemplated by those who ratified the First Amendment. To the
contrary, a proposed draft of the First Amendment by Thomas Jefferson
shows that the free press envisioned by the Framers did not encompass the
publication of falsehoods-commercial or noncommercial: "The people
shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak or to write or
otherwise to publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life,
liberty, property or reputation of others or affecting the peace of the
confederacy with foreign nations.,'' 4 This view accords with the
110 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *431.
111 See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 8 (1979). See also WILLIAM F. WALSH, A
HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 328-29 (1932) (tracing the development of action of deceit from
mid-fourteenth century).
112 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 192 (1836).
113 Id.
114 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 367, 367 (J. Boyd ed., 1958); see also David S.
Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 440 n.52 (1983) (discussing
106
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prevailing and long-standing common law notions discussed above.
For similar reasons-namely, that freedom of speech must be
understood against the common-law background existing at the time of the
First Amendment's ratification-advertisements of unlawful products
must also be regarded as outside the scope of constitutional protection.
According to Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, the
common law considered it a criminal offense to "procure, counsel, or
command another to commit a crime." ' 5 As noted by a seminal British
case of the time, "A solicitation or inciting of another, by whatever means
it is attempted, is an act done; and that such an act done with a criminal
intent is punishable by indictment has been clearly established by . . .
several cases." '" 6 Thus, advertising unlawful products could be prohibited
at common law because such a message is, in essence, an invitation to
commit a crime, and-like speech conveying false information-ought
therefore be understood as an exception to the First Amendment protection
afforded to commercial speech.
D. Assessment of the Evidence
The evidence put forth in this Part presents great difficulties for those
who would suggest that colonial Americans in any way considered
commercial speech to be "low value." At the outset, as noted in the
Introduction, the text of the First Amendment does not distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial speech. Furthermore, nothing in the
Framers' philosophical worldview justifies drawing a distinction between
"economic" and "civil" rights; to the contrary, leading American
Founders, including James Madison, understood the protection of property
to be the central purpose of free government. The evidence above also
shows that the Framing generation's commitment to commercial speech
was not merely an abstract one; the historical experience of Franklin's
defense of his handbill and the attacks on the Stamp Acts indicate a
willingness, particularly on the part of printer-revolutionaries, to defend
advertising with the same ardor, and employ the same arguments, that they
mustered in fighting off other attacks on the freedom of the press. Perhaps
most convincingly, it appears that commercial speech was inseparable
from the very idea of a free American press. Advertising not only provided
the revenues for colonial newspapers, but contained substantive
commercial information that was at least as eagerly valued as news by
many readers. In accordance with this Article's conclusion about the
importance of commercial speech to early Americans, the only restrictions
Jefferson's proposed draft of the First Amendment).
115 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *36.
116 The King v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269, 276 (K.B. 1801).
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on advertising apparently extant during the colonial era were those
promoting products already made illegal by state legislatures.
The understanding of the First Amendment that is compelled by this
historical evidence is both broader and narrower than the view we take
today. It is broader in that it would extend full First Amendment
protections to commercial communications; it is narrower in that it would
exclude all demonstrably false speech that causes identifiable harm to
individuals.' 17  The fact that "demonstrably false" speech was not
understood by the Framing generation to be constitutionally protected
would not, however, threaten political speech; unlike speech that can
objectively be shown to be false (such as fraud, libel, and transferal of
false scientific information), speech advancing political ideas and opinions
cannot be proven false." 8 Thus, there should not be, as the Supreme Court
now holds, a "distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech."" 9 Rather, the distinction should be drawn between demonstrably
false speech (including commercial speech, which can be regulated to
ensure its truthfulness) and speech that is not amenable to a demonstration
of falsity, such as speech about political ideas. 20
117 There is, however, considerable support in Supreme Court precedent for the argument
that deliberate falsehoods are not protected by the Constitution. The Court said in Garrison v.
Louisiana:
The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the
constitutional question. Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further
the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie,
knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like
immunity. At the time the First Amendment was adopted, as today, there were
those unscrupulous enough and skillful enough to use the deliberate or reckless
falsehood as an effective political tool to unseat the public servant or even topple
an administration. . . . [T]he use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with
the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which
economic, social, or political change is to be effected. Calculated falsehood falls
into that class of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clea'rly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality .... " Hence the knowingly false statement and the false statement made
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (citations omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974) ("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statement of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on
public issues.").
118 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); Judith
Schenk Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 816 (1984).
119 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 522 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
120 As Justice Stevens recently noted, "[iln the commercial context, . . . govemment is not
only permitted to prohibit misleading speech that would be protected in other contexts .... but it often
requires affirmative disclosures that the speaker might not make voluntarily." Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Compare 44 Liquormart v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) ("When a state regulates commercial messages to protect
consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of
beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for
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II. Regulation of Commercial Speech During the Civil War Era
This Part shows that the robust tradition of American commercial
speech discussed in Part I continued and expanded through the Civil War
and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that there is no
evidence suggesting that commercial speech was considered to be "low
value" at that time. On the contrary, an examination of state legislative
practices at and around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification reveals that-to the degree that advertising was regulated at
all-states continued to focus their regulatory efforts on limiting
advertising for illegal products and services.'' Furthermore, the limited
Supreme Court jurisprudence on commercial speech during this period
does not suggest that commercial and noncommercial speech were
understood to be afforded differing degrees of constitutional protection.
Adherents to purely "originalist" theories of constitutional
interpretation may find this evidence irrelevant, and consider the matter
settled after an assessment of the understanding of those who drafted and
ratified the First Amendment. However, there is reason to believe that
Reconstruction-era history can illuminate even an originalist inquiry into
the meaning of free speech. Like most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the First Amendment originally constrained only the federal
government, stating that "Congress shall make no law" abridging speech
or press.'22 Today, however, most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights-
including the First Amendment-are considered by the Supreme Court to
have been "incorporated" against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, and now are understood as constraints on the exercise of
power by state and local governments as well. 12 3 Accordingly, even
originalist jurists like Justice Scalia have found Reconstruction-era
legislative practices relevant to an inquiry into the extent of constitutional
according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict
review.") (Stevens, Kennedy, & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 339 (1974) ("Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.").
121 This conclusion rests upon an examination of all state codes published closest to 1868.
For states with less frequently published codes, the last code published before 1868 and the first one
published after 1868 were examined to determine the state of the law at the time of incorporation. The
Territorial Codes of Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and New Mexico were also examined. The State
Code of Wisconsin could not found, but the codes of the other thirty-seven states admitted to the union
by 1880 were examined. See INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 748-82 (Otto Johnson ed., 49th ed.
1996).
122 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
123 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying Fifth Amendment privilege
against self incrimination against the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying
Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures against the states);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying First Amendment right to the free exercise of
religion against the states). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Did The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
The Bill of Rights Against States?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 443 (1996).
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protection afforded commercial speech. 124 Furthermore, some scholars
have recently suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment should be
understood not only as procedurally incorporating provisions of the Bill of
Rights against the states, but as substantively changing the content of those
provisions as well. 25 In response to such potential objections to my
originalist conclusions set forth in Part I-and, furthermore, as a matter of
general historical interest-this Part sets forth the tradition of commercial
speech leading up to the Reconstruction Amendments.
A. The State ofAdvertising During the Reconstruction Era
Historian James Playsted Wood notes that advertising was "vigorous
and thriving by the mid-nineteenth-century mark." 126 In 1847, one
publisher stated that advertising had a news-like quality that had as much
appeal to readers as did reporting on the day's events.1 27 To illustrate, a
typical issue of the New York Herald in 1860 carried thousands of small-
space advertisements. Like many of its colonial counterparts, its front page
bore no editorial matter, only advertising.1 28 Only the intense interest in the
Civil War supplanted advertising as the front-page material in most
papers."' Nonetheless, even in 1869, the New York Herald typically held
eight columns of editorial comment, thirty-eight columns of news, and
fifty columns of advertising. 3°
Although interest in the Civil War may have pushed advertising from
the front page, the demonstrated ability of advertising to sell Union war
bonds led to a vast expansion of advertising's use.13 1 A year after the close
of the Civil War:
Every rock with surface broad enough, and facing in a direction from
which it could be seen, and every cliff which some adventurous painter
had been able to climb was daubed over with signs. Every fence, every
unoccupied building, the boardings around every large construction site,
even the New York curbstones, shouted advertising messages. Fences
along the highways and railroad rights of way wore advertising in letters
124 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (identifying as highly relevant to commercial speech inquiry the "state legislative practices
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, since it is most improbable that that adoption was
meant to overturn any national consensus regarding free speech").
125 The leading exponent of this position is Akhil Amar. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (1998).
126 WOOD, supra note 51, at 158.
127 See id. at 159-60.
128 See id. at 166-67; MOTT, supra note 56, at 397-98, 593-94.
129 See MOTT, supra note 56, at 397; PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 259.
130 See WOOD, supra note 51, at 169.
131 See PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 253.
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from six inches to two feet high. Bridges, especially covered bridges,
bore huge advertising signs.13
2
Advertising's prominence also led to other innovations including the
first advertising agent in 1841,'33 the first newspaper directory in 1869,'34
and the first market survey in 1879.13' George Wakeman, writing in
Galaxy magazine in 1867, described advertising in the United States as
having arrived at the point at which
the names of successful advertisers have become household words where
great poets, politicians, philosophers and warriors of the land are as yet
unheard of; there is instant recognition of Higg's saleratus and Wigg's
soap even where the title of Tennyson's last work is thought to be "In the
Garden" and Longfellow understood as the nickname of a tall man.136
Advertising had become a major part of American culture.
B. State Regulation ofAdvertising and the Press During Reconstruction
Even as advertising emerged as an increasingly powerful social force,
state governments allowed it to grow unchecked, restricting only the
promotion of illegal products and services. 3  The restrictions on
advertising that did exist were aimed at the illegality of the advertised
conduct, rather than at advertising itself. For example, Delaware barred
advertising by unlicensed lottery retailers. 138 Similarly, Vermont barred
"the advertising of lotteries not granted by the legislature of this state, or of
the United States."' 3 9 Significantly, the products, services, or activities that
could not be advertised in the Reconstruction era were prohibited in their
entirety (e.g., unlicensed innkeeping, illegal horse racing, and lotteries).
Such activities, when lawful, could be advertised.
132 WOOD, supra note 51, at 182; see also PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 255.
133 See G. ALLEN FOSTER, ADVERTISING: ANCIENT MARKET PLACE TO TELEVISION 48-49
(1967).
134 See WOOD, supra note 51, at 142.
135 See FOSTER, supra note 133, at 126-31.
136 PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 255.
137 For example, a number of states continued to restrict lottery advertising. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE, § 323 (1872); CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 12, § 150 (1866); DEL. REV. STAT. chap. 98, v. 12,
§ 6 (1874); DIGEST OF LAWS OF FLA. ch. 80, § 4 (1881); IOWA CODE, § 4043 (1873); COMPILED LAWS
OF KAN. ch. 31, § 342 (1885); KY. REV. STAT. ch. 28, art. 21, § 4 (1860 & Supp. 1866); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 11, ch. 128, § 13 (1884); MD. CODE art. 30, § 114 (1860); MISS. REV. CODE, § 2605 (1871);
COMPILED LAWS OF NEV.§ 2498 (1873); N.Y. REV. STAT., ch. 20, tit. 8, § 53 (1875); OREGON GEN.
LAWS, Crim. Code, ch. 8, § 661 (1874); COMPILED LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH § 2002 (1876);
VT. GEN. STAT. ch. 119, § 7 (1870).
138 See DEL. REV. STAT., ch. 98, v. 12, § 6(1874).
139 VT. STAT., tit. 34, ch, 119, § 7(1870).
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Also during this time, in response to an aggressive anti-abortion
campaign beginning in the 1840s, 140 many states adopted extensive
abortion restrictions, which were accompanied by limits on the right to
advertise abortion services. One such restriction, for example, imposed
penalties on "[e]very person, who shall, by publication, lecture . . . or by
advertisement, or the sale or circulation of any publication, encourage or
prompt the commission of [a miscarriage].,, 141 These limits on abortion
advertising applied with equal force to all speech advocating abortion,
commercial or noncommercial. Other illegal products or activities that
could not be advertised included prize fights 142 and obscene books.
143
Similarly, West Virginia, New York, and Kansas, like their modem
counterparts, barred obscene advertising.14
4
The most prevalent state legislative interaction with advertising
during the Reconstruction era was in the mandatory use of advertising to
give legal notice. For example, state codes required notice via advertising
for executors sale, 145 partitions of land, 146 limited partnerships,
147 liens, 148
and even impounded beasts. 49 Eighteen of thirty-eight states examined in
this period required some type of advertising as a form of legal notice.1
50
The prevalence of advertising actually led to state protection of the
property interests of advertisers, through statutes prohibiting the
unauthorized removal of advertising.'' States also sought to prevent
140 See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 147-70 (1978).
141 CONN. GEN. STAT., tit. 12, ch. 2, § 25 (1866); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 317 (1872);
DIGEST OF LAWS OF FLA. ch. 59, § 10 (1881); COMPILED LAWS OF KAN. ch. 31, § 342 (1885); MD.
LAWS ch.179 § 2 (1868); MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 165, § 10 (1860); N.J. REV. STAT. Crimes, § 44
(1874); N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 78 (1875); OHIO REV. STAT. ch. 2732, §1 (1860 &
Supp.); R.I. GEN. STAT. ch. 232, § 23 (1872); COMPILED LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH, Penal
Code tit. 9, ch. 8 § 162 (4) (1876).
142 See COMPILED LAWS OF KAN. ch. 31, § 338 (1885).
143 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(4) (1872); COMPILED LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH,
Penal Code tit. 9, ch. 8, § 162(4) (1876).
144 SeeCOMPILED LAWSOF KAN., ch. 31, § 342 (1885); N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 6, §
77 (1875); W. VA. CODE ch. 149, § 11 (1868).
145 See COMPILED LAWS OF ALA. § 2070 (1867); GA. CODE § 3649-50 (1873); ILL. REV
STAT. ch. 77, § 12 (1874); KY. REV. STAT. ch. 36, art. 13, § 2(2) (1860); NEB. REV. STAT pt. 2 § 490
(1866); DIGEST OF LAWS OF PENN., Execution § 78 (1872).
146 See COMPILED LAWS OF ALA. § 3110 (1867); COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 67, § 6 (1868).
147 See ME. REV. STAT. ch. 33, § 5 (1884); DIGEST OF LAWS OF PENN., Limited Partnerships
§ 9 (1872).
148 See COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 54, § 5 (1868).
149 See ME. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 12(1884).
150 See COMPILED LAWS OF ALA. (1867); DIGEST OF LAWS OF ARK. (1874); COLO. REV.
STAT. (1868); GA. CODE (1873); ILL. STAT. (1872); IND. STAT. (Supp. 1875); IOWA CODE (1873); KY.
REV. STAT. (1860 & Supp. 1866); LA. CODE (1867); ME. REV. STAT. (1871); MD. CODE (1860 &
Supp. 1868); MASS. GEN. STAT. (1860 & Supp. 1870); NEB. REV. STAT. (1866); N.H. GEN. STAT.
(1867); N.Y. REV. STAT. (1875); OHIO REV. STAT. (Supp. 1868); DIGEST OF LAWS OF PENN. (1873);
S.C. REV. STAT. (1873).
151 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ch. 28 amend., § 1 (1860); NEB. REV. STAT. pt. 3, ch. 12, § 144
(1866); N.H. GEN. STAT. ch. 263, § 10 (1867).
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advertisers from trespassing on the property rights of other citizens by
penalizing the placement of advertising in unauthorized locations."5 2 There
was no record of legislation barring false and misleading advertising of
lawful products and services during this period, and no record of
advertising regulations serving other purposes.
Nonetheless, as advertising increased, so too did the recognition that,
if false, advertisements could cause harm. Thus, beginning around 1864,
certain more successful newspapers refused to accept advertisements for
questionable patent medicines and quacks.15 1 Indeed, many papers warned
their readers against these disreputable advertisers, and in 1872, the
national government enacted regulations aimed at restricting the
dissemination of fraudulent advertisements through the mail. 1
5 4
C. Advertising in the Supreme Court During the Post-Civil War Era
The Supreme Court did not decide any cases relating to advertising
before the Civil War. To the extent that the Supreme Court addressed
issues relating to advertising during Reconstruction, its decisions were
consistent with the view that advertising was no different than other forms
of speech. To illustrate, in Ex parte Jackson115 the Court held that
Congress's 1868 ban on the advertising of lotteries by mail did not violate
the First Amendment. The opinion dealt not with any distinction between
commercial and noncommercial messages, but rather with Congress's
power over the postal system, stating that "[tihe right to designate what
shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be
excluded."'5 6 Thus, according to Judge Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner,
the Court "[c]onsidered advertising (or at least printed circulars advertising
lotteries) to be speech entitled to the same degree of First Amendment
protection as any other."'
' 57
152 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 10 (1884); MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 349 (1860 &
Supp. 1877); R.I. GEN. STAT. ch. 230, § 31 (1872).
153 See WOOD, supra note 51 at 181.
154 See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 283 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994))
(authorizing the Postmaster General, after a hearing, to issue a Fraud Order directing the local
postmaster to cease delivering mail or paying postal money orders addressed to a merchant determined
fraudulently to have obtained money or property through the mail).
155 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
156 Id. at 732.
157 Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 765 (1993).
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III. Regulation of Commercial Speech During the First Half of the
Twentieth Century
This Part explains how commercial speech came to be regarded, by
the end of the first half of the twentieth century, as outside the bounds of
the First Amendment. Advertising continued to proliferate during the first
few decades of the twentieth century. As the Gilded Age gave way to the
Progressive Era, however, disenchantment with unfettered capitalism also
grew. 58 Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was marked by hostility to social welfare
legislation-particularly labor laws-based on the belief that it infringed
on natural rights of contract and property. This philosophy was embodied
in Lochner v. New York,' 59 decided in 1905, in which the Court struck
down a state law that placed a 60-hour limit on a bakery employee's work
week.
However, the notion that "civil" liberties were different from property
rights and economic liberties soon began to take hold in the culture.
60
Furthermore, during the 1920s, the Court began to apply the First
Amendment to the states, raising for the first time the question of whether
it protected advertising. These events culminated in the ultimate schism
between commercial and noncommercial speech that still persists in the
Court's jurisprudence today.
The Great Depression made people look at advertising differently.
Disenchantment with advertising, as with the entire capitalist system,
swelled. This cultural change had a profound effect on the Supreme Court,
which essentially stopped protecting economic rights. It was at this point,
in 1942, when the Court first addressed whether advertising was protected
by the First Amendment. Consistent with the new thinking of the Court
headed by Chief Justice Stone, the justices held that advertising was not
protected at all.1
61
A. Growth ofAdvertising and Reform Movements During the Early
Twentieth Century
Advertising's growth was marked by a professionalization of the
industry. By 1898, a survey by the Press and Printer of Boston counted
2,583 companies that advertised in regular periodicals of general
158 See, e.g., MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS 445-53 (1934); RUDOLPH J.R.
PERTZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 1888-1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 11 (1996) ("[Flaith
in common-law regulation, this trust in liberty of contract, was shaken by changed economic
circumstances.").
159 198 U.S. 45(1905).
160 See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955).
161 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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circulation.162 The 1904 St. Louis World's Fair recognized the growth of
the industry and staged "Ad-Men's Day" with a meeting grandly named
"The International Advertising Association. 163 Professionalization of
advertising continued with the creation of Associated Advertising Clubs,
later the Advertising Federation of America, which was formed in 1905.' 64
Other advertising groups were formed later, including the New York
Advertising League in 1906 and the American National Advertising
Managers in 1910.161
1. Reform Movements
Despite these moves within the industry, advertising was not immune
from the growing perception that a larger governmental role was needed to
check the unrestrained exercise of property rights. The first serious
concerns about advertising had been raised by the press itself against the
patent medicine industry. 166 Magazines that once had accepted the patent
medicine advertisements-such as the Ladies Home Journal and
Collier's-led the charge in 1904 and 1905 against the fraudulent claims
made by the industry. 167 Some papers, including the Scripps-McRae
League of Newspapers, appointed censors to scrutinize all advertising
copy for questionable claims. 168 The public outcry against adulterated and
dangerous foods and drugs ultimately led to the passage of the federal
Food and Drug Act of 1906.169 This legislation forced manufacturers to
justify their claims and list product ingredients.
Patent medicines were not the only target of early reformers. By the
early 1900s, billboards and other advertising were viewed by some as
littering the American landscape. 170 Concerns were also manifested about
testimonial advertising by celebrities that did not disclose that a fee had
been paid for their endorsement of the product. 171 These and other
concerns caused the advertising industry in 1911 to push for a model
statute barring "untrue, deceptive, or misleading" advertising.' 72 At that
time, only Massachusetts and New York had statutory provisions barring
fraudulent advertising. 173
162 See PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 362.
163 See GEORGE FRENCH, 20TH CENTURY ADVERTISING 119 (1926).
164 See WOOD, supra note 51, at 335.
165 See FRENCH, supra note 163, at 131, 141.
166 See WOOD, supra note 51, at 325.
167 See id. at 327-30, 332.
168 See id. at 334.
169 See id. at 333.
170 See id. at 347.
171 See id. at 392-93.
172 HURNARD J. KENNER, THE FIGHT FOR TRUTH IN ADVERTISING 28 (1936).
173 See WOOD, supra note 51 at 336.
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The advertising industry moved to address these concerns. By 1920,
thirty-seven states had adopted the Advertising Federation of America's
model antifraud statute. 74 Although politically significant and popular,
these state legislative efforts largely represented a codification of long-
standing common-law restrictions on false or misleading commercial
messages.
75
2. New Heights of Prestige For Advertising During World War I
Even in the wake of these reform movements, advertisers reached
new heights in public prestige and prevalence during the first few decades
of the twentieth century. Advertisements during World War I helped to sell
$24 billion in war bonds to twenty-two million Americans and raise $400
million for the Red Cross. 17 6 As Frank Presbrey remarked, "Advertising
did not win the war, but it did its bit so effectively that when the war was
over advertising . . . had the recognition of all governments as a prime
essential in any large undertaking in which the active support of all the
people must be obtained for success.' 77
As was the case after the Civil War, this widespread recognition of
the power of advertising during wartime was not lost on manufacturers and
retailers when peace returned. The New Republic effusively observed a
year after the armistice that the "advertising man was the acknowledged
genius of America" and that there was no longer a need for him to conceal
his awareness that he was the cornerstone of the newspapers and the
magazines. 1
78
Advertising's ascendancy continued into the 1920s. As President
Coolidge remarked at the 1926 International Advertising Association's
Washington convention, "The preeminence of America in industry ... has
come very largely through mass production. Mass production is only
possible where there is mass demand. Mass demand has been created
almost entirely through the development of advertising."'7 9
Business shared President Coolidge's assessment of advertising's
value. Total investment in advertising soared from $1.5 billion in 1918 to
almost $3 billion in 1920 and continued to grow throughout the decade. 80
Part of this growth stemmed from the use of radio as a new advertising
174 See id.
175 See WALSH, supra note I 1 I, at 328-29 (tracing the development of the action of deceit
from mid-fourteenth century).
176 See PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 565.
177 Id. at 566.
178 WOOD, supra note 51, at 367.
179 President Calvin Coolidge, Address at the International Advertising Association's
Washington Convention (1926), quoted in PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 598.
180 See WOOD, supra note 51, at 364-65.
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medium. Although the first radio advertisement did not air until 1923, by
1929 the industry received an estimated $15 million in advertising
revenues for its roughly 500 broadcast stations.19
l
B. Backlash from the Great Depression
The Great Depression hit advertising hard not only in terms of
income, but perhaps more importantly in public esteem. Following the
stock market crash, advertising revenues tumbled from $3.4 billion in 1929
to $1.3 billion in 1933.182 Just as advertising was perhaps irrationally
credited for the boom years, so too was it a target for blame as the
Depression took hold. Advertising was attacked as wasteful; its critics
charged that it did nothing more than add to the consumers' cost.'83 It was
not just an attack on advertising, however, because, as James Playsted
Wood explained, "[T]he entire economic system of which advertising was
seen as a vociferous, raucous and treacherous part, was under attack.'
8 4
Wood described the national search for the cause of the Depression as
follows:
There had to be a villain. Advertising as the public voice of industry and
business was obvious and accessible to attack. Advertising had been used
to urge people to expenditures they could not afford, to lure with false
promises, to lull into false security. Advertising was to blame, and shrill
cries arose for its annihilation. 1
85
Public skepticism about the role of advertising in the American economy
also rose significantly. The consumers' movement formed during this era,
producing best-selling exposds of advertising practices with such lurid
titles as 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs; Eat, Drink and Be Wary; and Partners
in Plunder. 1
86
The national mood during the Depression spurred calls for increased
restrictions on advertising. The federal government aggressively responded
to the perceived excesses of advertising. For example, Rexford Guy
Tugwell, a Columbia University economist who was later appointed an
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture by President Roosevelt, had written
extensively regarding "the waste and extravagance of advertising which
merely attempted to turn sales from one company to that of another
181 See PRESBREY, supra note 57, at 578.
182 See WOOD, supra note 51, at 417.
183 See id. at 424.
184 Id. at418.
185 Id.
186 See id. at 419-20.
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making a product identical in value.""1 7 Tugwell saw advertising as one of
the culpable inefficiencies of the discredited competitive system. I8 8 When
in office, Tugwell championed sweeping federal legislation to centralize
grade labeling, define false advertising, and centralize enforcement in the
Secretary of Agriculture.
8 9
C. Judicial Protection of Commercial Speech During the Lochner Era
Although disenchantment among the body politic with economic
liberties had led to increased state regulation of the economy, the Supreme
Court had acted as a brake on that sentiment, employing the doctrine of
substantive due process to strike down many state laws. Mistakenly,
advertising came to be regarded as an economic regulation to be analyzed
under the Due Process Clause, instead of under the First Amendment,
where it belonged. This confusion of categories-although it temporarily
resulted in greater protection of advertising than of political speech-
caused commercial speech to be unjustifiably segregated to
noncommercial speech and discredited when the doctrine of economic
substantive due process was properly discarded.
1. The U.S. Supreme Court and Advertising During the Lochner
Era
Before 1919, the Supreme Court treated political speech as subject to
regulation by the states pursuant to their police power. The Court did not at
this time treat the First Amendment as applying to, or constraining, the
states' power. 90 By contrast, the Court interpreted the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which explicitly applied to the states, as
limiting the ability of the states to restrict economic freedom.
For this reason, most judicial challenges during this period to
restrictions on advertising did not advance First Amendment claims.
Rather, they relied on a substantive due process claim that the restrictions
interfered with the pursuit of a lawful business. For example, in 1902 the
Supreme Court had held that the Postmaster General had unlawfully
stopped mail delivery based on his determination that a Christian Scientist
187 Id. at 426.
188 Then New York Governor Al Smith described Tugwell as follows: "He regards
advertising as largely a waste, and he thinks government should take a hand in limiting the costs to the
ultimate consumer by cutting out the advertising middle man. He also believes that government control
of industry will take the place of mere regulation . I... Id. at 427.
189 See id. at 426.
190 It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment applied to the
states. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925).
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School was engaged in mail fraud. 9 ' Justice Peckham did not discuss First
Amendment freedoms. Nonetheless, as Rudolph Peritz observes, he
showed "solicitude towards commercial speech" by finding the
government's enforcement of the law improper by characterizing Magnetic
Healing's activities as "mere matters of opinion upon subjects which are
not capable of proof as to their falsity."' 92 In essence, the Court was using
the Due Process Clause to protect economic liberty which, in this case,
happened to be advertising.
In summarizing the Supreme Court's attitude towards commercial
speech during the Lochner era, Peritz explains that "The Court did not
treat all speech as a political activity subject to government ordinance.
Some speech was protected as a valuable economic activity .... '[F]ree
trade in ideas' became a commercial canon long before it would become
the metaphorical key to constitutional protection of political speech."' 93
This transition to judicial treatment of advertising restrictions as
infringements on economic liberty is further illustrated, and perhaps
epitomized, by Halter v. Nebraska,194 decided in 1907, in which the Court
upheld a state law barring the use of the American flag on beer bottles. In
Halter, the parties failed even to raise a First Amendment challenge,
instead relying on a substantive due process claim.
2. State Courts and Advertising During the Lochner Era
State courts during this period also analyzed, and in many cases
invalidated, challenges to advertising regulations under the rubric of
substantive due process-i.e., they also treated such laws as potentially
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the First. For example, in
Ware v. Ammon, 95 the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1925 scrutinized an
act barring advertising by dry cleaners without first obtaining the fire
marshal's permission to engage in business. The court observed that "No
right of a citizen is more valuable than the right to earn his livelihood in
any lawful occupation."' 96 The Kentucky court struck down the statute as
unconstitutional, finding that a "necessary incident to this former right is
the further right to advertise one's business in any lawful and proper
191 See American Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
192 RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992, at 102-03 (1996).
193 Id. at 100-01.
194 205 U.S. 34 (1907). In other advertising cases, the Court rejected substantive due process
challenges to state and local restrictions on advertising. See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105
(1932); St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467
(1911).
195 278 S.W. 593 (Ky. Ct. App. 1925).
196 Id. at 595.
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way."'197 This decision illustrates the view of the time, which treated
advertising not as a right to communicate, but as an economic activity
subject to the same due process protection as other such activities.
Similarly, in Seattle v. Proctor, 198 the Washington Supreme Court in
1935 struck down as unreasonable a city statute compelling businesses to
disclose "the number of such ... [articles] and the lowest price at which
each of said articles was offered for sale to the public prior to said
advertisement."' 99 Arguably, the purpose of the regulation was to limit
false advertising by making clear that an advertised "sale" was really a sale
and that there were enough "sale" articles on hand to warrant the consumer
making a trip to the store. Notwithstanding this justification, the
Washington Supreme Court found that "The right to advertise one's
business is a valuable property right. 200 The court held that the legislature
could not, "under the guise of regulation [of false and misleading
advertising], impose arbitrary restrictions amounting to a denial of that
right., 2
0
Many state courts explicitly recognized that advertising implicated
both property rights and basic civil liberties secured by federal and state
constitutions. For example, in striking down a statute that barred funeral
directors from print advertising, the Indiana Supreme Court in 1942 held
that an "absolute prohibition, irrespective of considerations of public
welfare, of printed advertising of prices of services or commodities which
may lawfully be offered for sale, and which may be legally advertised
otherwise than visually, has no constitutional justification. '' 202 The same
court, later that year, struck down a law restricting price advertising by
optometrists, an obvious restraint on trade. In so doing, the Indiana Court
held:
Truthful price advertising is a legitimate incident to a lawful
merchandising business. Deprivation of the right so to advertise has been
held to violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....
We cannot assume that the Legislature intended to permit the sale of
eyeglasses as merchandise but to deprive the dealer of one of the
reasonable means of procuring purchasers for such merchandise.
203
197 Id. at 595.
198 48 P.2d 238 (Wash. 1935).
199 Id. at 239.
200 Id. at 240.
201 Id.
202 Needham v. Proffitt, 41 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Ind. 1942).




Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech
The states were divided on the impact of substantive due process on
distributing commercial handbills or soliciting customers. Many
ordinances were struck down on these grounds.2 °4 Other such ordinances
survived these challenges.20 5
D. The Supreme Court First Differentiates Commercial From
Noncommercial Speech
As the New Deal was born and hostility to unfettered capitalism
grew, states increasingly upheld commercial speech restrictions as a valid
exercise of the expanding police power over commerce.20 6 The same was
true of the United States Supreme Court. In its first case assessing whether
the First Amendment protected advertising, the Supreme Court-with little
discussion-held that "purely commercial" speech was not entitled to
constitutional protection.
In Valentine v. Chrestensen, °7 the Court considered the validity of a
New York City ordinance that barred the distribution of commercial and
business advertising material on the streets. Mr. Chrestensen first had
attempted to distribute a handbill soliciting patrons for a tour of an old
Navy submarine for a stated fee. After city authorities objected,
Chrestensen reprinted his handbill as a double-faced document. One side
advertised the exhibit and solicited visitors, without reference to an
admission price. The other side contained a protest against the City Dock
Department for its refusal to allow Chrestensen to use the city pier to
exhibit his submarine. Thus, the commercial and noncommercial elements
in the case were physically, if not analytically, inseparable.
In its opinion rejecting Chrestensen's claim, the Supreme Court did
recognize that states and municipalities cannot "unduly burden or
proscribe" the "exercise of the freedom of communicating information and
disseminating opinion" in public thoroughfares.0 8 But the Court held that
the "Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising."' 0 9 The majority concluded that the
addition of the handbill's second side was simply a ruse to evade the
204 See, e.g., Prior v. White, 180 So. 347 (Fla. 1938); In re Thornburg, 9 N.E.2d 516 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1936); City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 186 S.E. 783 (S.C. 1936).
205 See e.g., People v. St. John, 288 P. 53 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1930); City of
Philadelphia v. Brabender, 51 A. 374 (Pa. 1902).
206 See, e.g., People v. Pennock, 293 N.W. 759 (Mich. 1940) (upholding statute that made it
unlawful to display or advertise contraceptive devices); Allen v. McGovern, 169 A. 345 (N.J. 1933)
(upholding ordinance forbidding unsolicited advertising); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental
Exam'rs, 34 P.2d 311 (Or. 1934) (upholding ordinance barring dentists from certain types of
advertising), aff'd, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
207 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
208 Id. at 54.
209 Id.
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ordinance's effect and so could be disregarded with little comment.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Valentine, the notion of
substantive due process had been rejected, and review of economic
legislation had been reduced to "rational basis" scrutiny-a mode of
analysis extremely deferential to legislative judgments. " 0  Valentine's
dismissive treatment of commercial speech seems most closely linked to
the Court's line of cases rejecting economic substantive due process, rather
than any evaluation of the First Amendment guarantees envisioned by the
Founders. Lochner had been repudiated, and the notion of economic
liberty almost completely rejected; 211 to the extent commercial speech had
been viewed as some form of property interest, such speech appears to
have been categorized as an unprotected interest.212 Thus, what Professors
Doug Kmiec and John McGinnis have said about the Contracts Clause
applies as well to the protection of commercial speech: "Misinterpreted as
a form of substantive economic due process, [protection of commercial
speech] was wrongly discredited when that doctrine [of substantive due
process] was rightly discarded. 21 1
The Supreme Court's distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech was called into question almost immediately. The
three-page Valentine opinion had sidestepped the question of whether
speech driven by "mixed" profit and political motivations should be
treated differently-not to mention why, exactly, speech motivated by
commercial interests deserved no. constitutional consideration at all. As
later cases raised these issues, Justice Douglas, who had joined the
Valentine majority, stated in 1959, "The ruling was casual, almost offhand.
And it has not survived reflection.21 4
A few years later, the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan
21 S
involved a libel claim based on a political statement made in a paid
advertisement. The Court accorded full First Amendment protection to the
statement, despite its appearance in an advertisement. Sullivan highlighted
the problematic nature of the Supreme Court's sweeping treatment of
advertisements in Valentine, and cried out for a more nuanced analysis and
for reevaluation. By 1974, four justices agreed that there was "some doubt
210 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[R]egulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions" was not "to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless ... it [does not rest] upon some rational basis"); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
211 See, e.g., Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
212 See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1699, 1729-30
(1991) (describing the West Coast Hotel line of cases as legitimizing the activist state and repudiating
the prior era's Lochner-style constitutionalization of rights to property and contract).
213 Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (1987).
214 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
215 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Vol. 16:85, 1999
Advertising: Not "Low Value" Speech
concerning whether the 'commercial speech' distinction announced in
Valentine v. Chrestensen . . . retains continuing validity. 216 These cases
set the stage for the Supreme Court's explicit recognition that advertising
was entitled to constitutional protection.
IV. The Court's Current Approach: The Prospect of Protection and the
Pitfalls of Balancing
The preceding Part illustrated how the Court's mistreatment of
commercial speech as an economic due process right during the Lochner
era led the Court to stray from original First Amendment principles by
refusing in Valentine to afford constitutional protection to commercial
speech. This Part begins by showing how advertising addressing political
hot-button issues, such as civil rights and abortion, forced the Court to
reconsider its view that advertising was not entitled to any First
Amendment protection. This reevaluation culminated in the landmark
commercial speech decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,27 in which the Court ruled that
the First Amendment forbids an outright ban on all commercial
communications by an industry on the basis that they are somehow
inherently misleading.
In affording some constitutional protection for commercial speech,
however, the Court fell far short of providing advertising the constitutional
protection it deserves under the First Amendment.21 8 Instead, in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York,21 9 it adopted a balancing test requiring courts to weigh the competing
interests of commercial speakers and government regulators. This Part
argues that the subjective Central Hudson test, in addition to deviating
from the original understanding of the First Amendment set forth above,
has produced an inconsistent Supreme Court commercial speech
jurisprudence and sowed confusion in the lower courts; furthermore, its
indeterminacy has encouraged politicians to propose (occasionally
dramatic) restrictions on advertising of unpopular products. Although the
Court's recent decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island220 suggests
the possibility that the Court is moving toward a more protective stance in
commercial speech cases, the Court persists in its treatment of commercial
speech as "low value" speech. Accordingly, an abandonment of the
216 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (citation omitted)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
217 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
218 See supra Part 111.
219 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
220 417 U.S. 484 (1996).
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Central Hudson test-and the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech-is necessary both to return modem Supreme
Court jurisprudence to the original understanding of the First Amendment
and to eliminate the indeterminacy and confusion that has resulted from
the Central Hudson test.
A. Protection and Balancing: Virginia Pharmacy to Central Hudson
1. Rejection of Valentine
The resurrection of commercial speech rights began in 1975 with
Bigelow v. Virginia,221 a politically charged case concerning the legality of
advertisements for abortion services. In striking down a Virginia statute
that would have prohibited advertisements generated in New York, the
Court engaged in a rough sort of balancing test to weigh the state's interest
against the First Amendment protections attached to the advertisement.
The majority acknowledged that the state's asserted justification for the
abortion advertisement-maintaining the quality of medical care within its
borders-was a legitimate interest. Yet the Court concluded that the state's
interest did not outweigh the citizens' First Amendment right to receive
information about services lawfully offered outside its borders.
Although Bigelow involved other constitutional considerations not
usually present in commercial speech cases, 222 the Court used the opinion
to limit explicitly the holding of Valentine. The Court held that Valentine
was not "authority for the proposition that all statutes regulating
commercial advertising are immune from constitutional challenge. The
case obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that advertising
is unprotected per se., 2 3 The Court declined, however, to decide "the
precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of
advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate
or even prohibit.
224
221 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
222 The service advertised in Bigelow was directly connected to a constitutional right to
obtain an abortion, which the Court announced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), decided while
Bigelow was pending. Of course, most advertisements do not involve goods or services supporting the
exercise of a constitutional right.
223 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 820. Although Bigelow represented a major step forward for
commercial speech, the political overtones of the case limited the decision's applicability. The
majority found that the advertisement in Bigelow "did more than simply propose a commercial
transaction. It contained factual material of clear 'public interest."' Id. at 822. The Court said that the
advertisement's references to the legality of abortions for nonresidents in New York conveyed useful
facts to any reader "with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law
of another State and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia." Id.
224 Id. at 825. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun-who had also authored Roe v.
Wade-stated that "[a]dvertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation
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Later in the same term, however, the Court directly confronted a more
typical commercial speech dispute. The statute challenged in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,225
prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising the prices for which they
sold prescription drugs. The state claimed the ban was a necessary part of
its licensing scheme to guarantee that pharmacists conducted themselves
as professionals. Those challenging the ban claimed it only protected
pharmacists from competition.226
Virginia Pharmacy squarely held that pure commercial speech-that
is, speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction"-is
entitled to First Amendment protection. 27 The Court disfavored the
protection of citizens through govemment-enforced ignorance; rather, it
said, "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them., 228 The Court
recognized that "the free flow of commercial information is indispensable
... to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system" and to
"the formation of intelligent opinion as to how that system ought to be
regulated., 229 The opinion appeared, at least initially, to be more favorable
to commercial speech than the balancing approach suggested in
Bigelow.23° Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun eschewed the idea
of weighing the state's interest in regulating pharmacists against the First
Amendment benefits inherent in the free flow of information.231
Although Virginia Pharmacy clearly rejected the proposition that
commercial speech was unprotected under the First Amendment, the case
did not embrace the proposition that commercial speech was absolutely
protected from regulation. A footnote late in the opinion stated that
commercial speech may be differentiated from "other varieties" of
protected speech, as "a different degree of [constitutional] protection is
necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
that serves a legitimate public interest." Id. at 826. Government, however, could not insulate any
advertising restriction from a First Amendment challenge simply by labeling the communication at
issue "commercial speech." Id.
225 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
226 See id. at 753-54.
227 Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973)).
228 Id. at 770.
229 Id. at 765.
230 Although the majority in Virginia Pharmacy agreed that there was "a clear relationship
between the advertising in question and an activity that the government was legitimately regulating," it
gave that connection, in essence, short shrift. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766-70.
231 "[T]he choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia
General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for
us." Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
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information is unimpaired." '232 The Court posited that the government
could have greater scope to ensure that commercial messages were not
false or misleading, because-although the First Amendment requires high
tolerance of inaccuracies in noncommercial speech because of the risk of
chilling certain perspectives-the more robust nature of advertising, driven
as it is by simple commercial motives, makes it unlikely that such
restrictions would silence accurate, nondeceptive commercial
communication.233 The Court called this a "commonsense" distinction.234
It later proved, however, to be an unfortunate hook used to diminish First
Amendment protection of commercial speech.235
2. Central Hudson and the Balancing Test
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 236 the Court elaborated upon-and in the
process significantly diminished-the extent of the constitutional
protection it appeared to furnish commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy.
Based in part on the aforementioned footnote in the majority opinion in
Virginia Pharmacy,237 the Court adopted a balancing test, which gives the
government the opportunity to justify restrictions on commercial speech-
even if that speech is truthful and not deceptive.238 The indeterminacy of
this test runs the risk of allowing the government to adopt advertising
regulations based on the view, as one Justice cynically put it, "that
consumers should be misled or uninformed for their own protection.
2 39
In Central Hudson, the Court struck down a New York Public Service
Commission (PSC) regulation that prohibited all advertisements promoting
the use of electricity. Although it acknowledged that blanket bans on
commercial speech that were truthful and related to lawful activities have
been consistently invalidated,24 ° the Court concluded that all commercial
speech challenges should be reviewed through a four-part balancing
analysis. Under this balancing test, a court must determine whether:
232 Id. at 771-2 n.24.
233 See id.
234 Id. at 771 n.24.
235 Justice Blackmun himself has since argued that the passage has been misread. See Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573-79 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in judgment); see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 436
(1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
236 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
237 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
238 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-66.
239 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
240 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
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1) the commercial speech concerns a lawful activity and is not
misleading;
2) the government interest asserted to justify the regulation is
substantial;
3) the regulation directly advances that government interest; and
4) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.
241
Applying this four-step analysis to the facts in the Central Hudson case,
the Court held that the PSC regulation violated the First Amendment.242
Although Central Hudson rejected the Valentine-era's "highly
paternalistic" notion that government could completely suppress
commercial speech,243 the decision elevated Virginia Pharmacy's hint of
second-class status for commercial speech to the level of black-letter law.
Building on the supposedly "commonsense" distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech, the Court held that the First
Amendment accords a lesser level of protection to commercial speech.244
Thus, today, the Court regularly reiterates that "the Constitution . ..
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
241 See id. at 564-66. In a later case, the fourth prong of the test was redefined as requiring
only that the fit between the state's goal and the challenged regulation be reasonable. See Board of
Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
242 There was no claim that the advertisements were inaccurate or related to unlawful
activities. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The commission asserted two interests-a state
interest in conserving energy and a concern that rates be fair and efficient-that the Court determined
were substantial state interests. See id. at 567. However, the regulation failed the third step of the test
because the majority found that the state simply could not demonstrate that the "link between the
advertising prohibition" and the state's goal of maintaining "fair and efficient rates" was anything
more than "tenuous." Id. at 569. And, although the Court accepted the argument that the advertising
ban could directly advance the state's goal of energy conservation, the regulation also failed the fourth
step of the test because it was more extensive than necessary to serve this interest. See id. at 570-71.
The PSC ban on advertising swept so broadly-or, in legal terms, proved so overinclusive-that it
prohibited even advertisements that would promote more efficient services and reduce energy use.
243 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562.
244 Despite the holding invalidating the regulation at issue in Central Hudson, the justices
most supportive of First Amendment protection for commercial speech were displeased with the
analysis used to reach that result. In concurring with the outcome of the case only, Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justice Brennan, asserted that the Central Hudson test was "not consistent with our prior
cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial
speech." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun & Brennan, J.J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
also argued that the newly announced "intermediate" standard of First Amendment review for
commercial speech should not be applied "when a State seeks to suppress information about a product
in order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State cannot or has not regulated or
outlawed directly." Id. at 573. Influencing "public conduct through manipulation of the availability of
information" was an illegitimate government goal. Id at 578. Justice Blackmun's position, if not his
logic, brings him to the same conclusion reached through historical analysis of the First Amendment.
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constitutionally guaranteed expression. 2 45
B. Defects In the Court's Current Approach
For nearly twenty years, the Central Hudson test has been used to
assess restrictions on advertising. More often than not, the Court has found
challenged restrictions on. commercial speech to be unconstitutional. On
those occasions, the intermediate scrutiny imposed by the Central Hudson
analysis turned out to be searching indeed.246 For example, in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,247 Edenfield v. Fane,248 and Rubin
v. Coors Brewing Co.,249 the Court emphasized the heavy burden that the
245 Id. at 563.
246 Commercial speech has benefited from its association, in a number of key cases, with
favored liberal causes such as reproductive freedom and civil rights. For example, in Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), the Court, in striking down a law restricting
(among other things) advertising or displaying of contraceptives, refused to countenance the
suppression of information about the price and availability of contraceptives. The Court rejected the
contentions that such advertisements would offend and embarrass those exposed to them, or legitimize
sexual activity among young people, finding that these justifications do not validate the suppression of
expression protected by the First Amendment. Following the logic of Carey, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives, recognizing that when the asserted governmental interest
is not to protect the recipient from deception, but from the perceived ill effects of receipt of truthful
information, the messages are protected. See id. at 74.
In Linmark Associates v. Willingboro Township, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), the Court unanimously
overturned a municipal ordinance that forbade the posting of real estate "For Sale" signs and was
adopted to stem the perceived flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated community. See
id. at 96. As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court held that "we were unpersuaded that the law was
necessary to achieve this objective, and ... that, in any event, the First Amendment disabled the State
from achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful information." Id. at 95.
The Court has also been particularly active in protecting the right of attorneys to advertise. See,
e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (invalidating a rule
prohibiting the truthful statement in an advertisement that an attorney is certified as a "specialist" by
the National Board of Trial Advocacy); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding
that the First Amendment protects truthful, nonmisleading letters sent to individuals known to face
particular legal problems); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that truthful at-
tomey advertising is constitutionally protected).
247 507 U.S. 410 (1993). In Discovery Network, the Court struck down a city ban that
prohibited newsracks on public property if the racks were used to distribute "commercial handbills."
The city had only allowed the use of newsracks containing "newspapers." Id. at 418. Although it
assumed that Cincinnati's asserted interests in safety and esthetics were legitimate, the Court held that
because both "commercial handbills" and "newspapers" were responsible for the safety problems and
esthetic concerns motivating the ban, the city had failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between its
goals and the restriction. See id. at 426-27.
248 507 U.S. 761 (1993). In Edenfield, the Court struck down a restriction, imposed and
enforced by the Florida Board of Accountancy, that prohibited CPAs from making uninvited in-person
visits or telephone calls to a potential client. See id. at 764-65. Although the Court did not seriously
question the board's asserted interest in protecting consumers from fraud, l.t ruled that the cold-call ban
failed under the third prong of the Central Hudson test because the board had not adequately
demonstrated that personal solicitation caused the harms the board allegedly aimed to avoid. See id. at
771.
249 514 U.S. 476 (1995). In Coors Brewing, the Court invalidated a federal law that barred
brewers from displaying the alcohol content of their beers on the labels of their products. The Court,
while acknowledging the government's substantial interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare
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government bears in defending restrictions on commercial speech, and the
mass of evidence that the government must adduce to sustain that
burden.2
50
The Court has been inconsistent in its application of Central Hudson,
however. As might be expected given the subjective nature of the test, the
Court has sometimes used a relatively weak version of intermediate
scrutiny. In particular, the Court has upheld restrictions on advertising that
either (1) ostensibly prevented consumers from being misled or (2)
concerned products, services, or activities that were not unambiguously
lawful.2"' Moreover, in cases such as United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co.,252 and Florida Bar v. Went For It, 253 the Court has suggested that
deference is due to (often self-serving) legislative determinations that the
of its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength, found that the
labeling restriction did not "directly" advance the government's interest. See id. at 491. Furthermore,
the Court roundly rejected the government's position that legislatures have broader latitude to regulate
speech that promotes "socially harmful activities" such as gambling, or alcohol or tobacco
consumption. See id. at 482-83.
250 Reaffirming the importance of free communication of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial information, the Court stated in Edenfield:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life,
provides a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and
information are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker
and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented.
507 U.S. at 767.
251 See. e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (approving a requirement that attorneys inform the public that they may be
responsible for costs (but not legal fees) if they hire a lawyer on a contingent fee basis "as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers"); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (upholding a statute banning the use of trade
names by optometric offices on the ground that "there is a significant possibility that trade names will
be used to mislead the public"); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding a
ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers because (1) it prevented attorneys from taking commercial
advantage of prospective clients who may be misled or deceived in the proposed transaction and (2)
the facts of the case were particularly egregious).
252 509 U.S. 418 (1993). In Edge, the Court employed sweeping language to uphold federal
legislation which banned broadcasts of lottery advertising by radio stations in nonlottery states, but
which allowed such advertisements to be broadcast by stations located in states that had state-
supported lotteries. The Court held that the legislation directly advanced the federal government's
interest in "balancing the interests of lottery and non-lottery States" even if the advancement of that
interest was "only marginal." Id. at 428-29. In Edge the proscribed messages concerned gambling, a
long-disfavored activity. Such proscription is not entirely inconsistent with the original understanding
of the First Amendment, which did not protect advertising of illegal activities. However, Edge seemed
to indicate that the Supreme Court would be willing to defer to the legislature as to whether the
regulation would "directly advance" a state's asserted interest, and that any restriction or advertising
would automatically advance the goal of diminishing consumption of the advertised product.
253 515 U.S. 618 (1995). In Went For It, the Court upheld a bar association rule prohibiting
lawyers from sending direct mail solicitations to personal injury victims until thirty days after the
injury. After finding substantial the Bar's interests in protecting privacy of victims and curbing
activities negatively affecting judicial process, the Court deemed the restrictions permissible because
they affected only mailings targeting victims when they were most vulnerable (within 30 days of an
accident) and addressed the immediate harm to the Bar's reputation that any such mailings created. See
id. at 625, 634.
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restriction will advance the asserted governmental interest. To reach these
inconsistent results, the Court has had to constantly rework the balancing
test, creating a malleable standard capable of being manipulated by lower
court judges.254 This phenomenon has caused some justices increasingly to
become dissatisfied with the test-some because of its extra-constitutional
nature, and some because of their unhappiness with its application in
particular controversies.
I. Specific Flaws in the Central Hudson Test
In most applications of Central Hudson, the first and second prongs
of the test are not at issue. The first prong, concerning whether the speech
involves a lawful activity and is not misleading, is generally
uncontroversial. As discussed in Part I, there is a solid basis for concluding
that, as a historical matter, demonstrably false speech is outside the
freedom of speech understood by the. Framers to be protected by. the First
Amendment; the same may be said of solicitations to engage in unlawful
activities. Accordingly, state and federal statutes regulating unlawful or
misleading communications are rarely challenged and, when they are, the
statutes are invariably upheld.
One troubling question that does arise under the first prong of the
Central Hudson test, however, is the breadth of the government's power to
restrict speech on the grounds that it is "misleading." This is particularly
an issue when the government is ostensibly seeking to protect an audience
that it considers especially susceptible to being misled. Increasingly,
government agencies are seeking to justify restrictions of speech based on
the need to protect children from being misled, an issue that is considered
at greater length below.255 Also, government bodies have successfully
sought to shield accident victims from the importuning of lawyers.256
To a certain extent, the problem of assessing when the government is
genuinely seeking to guard against fraud will always exist. This is so even
if the Court were to hold, in accordance with the original understanding of
the First Amendment, that commercial speech is entitled to heightened
judicial scrutiny. In that case, courts still would need to assess if the
regulations were truly aimed at guarding against fraudulent or misleading
communications or, alternatively, if the government was using fraud as a
justification to censor speech of which it disapproves for other reasons.
254 Even a defender of the intermediate scrutiny approach acknowledges that "[n]ot only are
the terms of the intermediate scrutiny test themselves indeterminate, but the test itself has also been
particularly vulnerable to manipulation by the Supreme Court." Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle
Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 301 (1998).
255 See infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
256 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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Thus, for example, a restriction prohibiting advertisements for a product
that children may not lawfully consume may be justifiable if it is limited to
advertisements that are directed at, and primarily received by, children.
Such a prohibition can be characterized as either guarding against
solicitation or ensuring that children are not misled into buying a product
that is unlawful for them to buy. Yet a prohibition on all outdoor
advertising of alcohol or tobacco, defended on the grounds that children
are in the audience, could not credibly be defended as necessary to guard
children against an illegal solicitation or being misled. Such a restriction
would, in traditional First Amendment parlance, be overbroad, meaning
that it would not be narrowly targeted to solving the problem it is
ostensibly meant to avoid.
If most of the audience receiving a truthful advertisement about a
lawful product would not be misled by such an advertisement, or may
lawfully purchase the advertised product, the government should not be
permitted to restrict that advertisement to protect the few who may be
misled or who may not lawfully purchase or consume such a product. Any
other rule would enable the government to evade the constraints of the
First Amendment by citing a few vulnerable members of the population.
Perhaps the legislature should be afforded some latitude in defining fraud,
which has traditionally required judicial determinations of whether a
reasonable person would have been misled. But balanced against any such
deference must be a recognition-largely absent in the Court's
jurisprudence, but clearly present in the minds of many in the Framing
generation 257 -that commercial speech is vital to the market and to the
functioning of democracy, and therefore should not be accorded "low
value," second-class status.
As for the second prong of the Central Hudson test, which concerns
the substantiality of the government interest in regulating commercial
speech, courts generally take a deferential view toward lawmakers' power
to define a governmental interest. Few, if any, cases have turned on
whether the second prong of Central Hudson is satisfied. Instead, courts
generally acknowledge the substantiality of the government's interest and
then turn to an assessment of the third and fourth prongs of the Central
Hudson balancing test.
It is perhaps not surprising that these third and fourth prongs have
proved to be the major battleground on which commercial speech
arguments continue to be waged. Whether a restriction works to "directly
advance" a state interest, thereby fulfilling the third prong of the test,
depends on both the particular facts of a case and, to some extent, a court's
subjective judgment. Likewise, determining whether the means to an end
257 See supra Part 1.
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(a challenged restriction) and the end itself (the state's asserted goal) fit
together closely enough to satisfy the fourth prong can be an elusive
matter. If it is a legitimate government interest to limit the consumption of
a product or service that has the capacity to harm people-which can
include ice cream, junk food, milk, meat, snowmobiling, or almost
anything else-then any restriction on advertising of such a product can
arguably be said to "directly advance" that interest.258 Once that hurdle is
reached, the question under the current analysis then becomes whether
there exist "numerous and obvious '259 less restrictive alternatives to the
government's chosen limitation. This inquiry is heavily spiced with
reasonableness considerations, 260 leading to great subjectivity in analysis
and -the risk of inconsistent results, as will be seen in ensuing sections.
2. An Example of Central Hudson's Harmful Potential: Posadas
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,26
decided in 1986, is perhaps the quintessential example of Central Hudson
gone awry. In Posadas the Court upheld Puerto Rico's restriction on
casino gambling advertising aimed at residents of Puerto Rico, which was
adopted to circumscribe the perceived ill effects of casino gambling on the
island's citizens.262 Thus, the word "casino" could not be used in
"matchbooks, lighters, envelopes, inter-office and/or external
correspondence, invoices, napkins, brochures, menus, elevators, glasses,
plates, lobbies, banners, flyers, paper holders, pencils, telephone books,
directories, bulletin boards or in any hotel dependency or object which
may be accessible to the public in Puerto Rico. '263 Advertising to tourists
was allowed, however; specifically, "advertising distributed or placed in
landed airplanes or cruise ships in jurisdictional waters and in restricted
areas to travelers only in the international airport and the docks where
tourist cruise ships arrive" was permitted.264
The Court upheld the restriction. First, it accepted without analysis
the Puerto Rico legislature's asserted interest in safeguarding island
258 See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 352
(1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This assertion is highly disputable in many instances because most
advertising in mature markets does not increase consumption, but rather influences a consumer's
choice of brands. See JOHN E CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION 83 (1997). Yet courts have been
unwilling to accept these arguments, especially where the legislature has found otherwise.
259 E.g, City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1996)
(observing that commercial speech restrictions are impermissible if alternatives are "numerous" and
"obvious").
260 See. e.g., Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)
(stating that the fit between the ends and the means must be reasonable).
261 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
262 See id.
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residents from the "disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase
in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption,
and the infiltration of organized crime" that casino gambling would
cause. 265 It then found reasonable Puerto Rico's belief "that advertising of
casino gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico would serve to increase
the demand for the product advertised., 266 The Court also deferred to the
legislature's determination that its restrictions on casino advertising were
"no more extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest., 267
As the Supreme Court has since recognized, Posadas makes little
sense. 268 This approach of giving the government deference in its
judgments about whether a restriction "directly advances" the asserted
interests in a "narrowly tailored" way turns the First Amendment on its
head. Judicial deference to legislative actions is generally a sound policy.
But where constitutional rights such as free speech are clearly at issue,
courts have an obligation, in the form of a textual warrant, to intervene.
The purpose of the First Amendment-indeed, of the entire Bill of
Rights-is to empower the judiciary to second-guess legislators. So long
as there is a clear warrant in the Constitution to do so, as there is here, the
function of the Bill of Rights is to place limits on the majority's power to
act. It is therefore contradictory to integrate a rule of deference to the
legislature into an inquiry that is, by definition, meant to second-guess, and
constrain, the majority. Furthermore, general First Amendment principles
prohibit the government from targeting behavior by limiting speech.269 If a
product presents such a danger that it is worthy of governmental
intervention, the government should seek to limit the use of that product
directly, not indirectly by restricting its advertising.
The Posadas Court is also vulnerable for its advancement of the
widely criticized argument270 that the "greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of
casino gambling., 27 ' This is quite a dangerous notion. The idea that
government can seek to affect consumption by prohibiting advertising
would eliminate all constitutional protection for advertising. Modem-day
state legislatures arguably have the power to outlaw almost any product or
service (other than those that are constitutionally protected themselves, of
course, such as books or newspapers). If the power to forbid the
265 Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
266 Id. at 342.
267 Id. at 343 ("We think it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not .. .a
'counterspeech' policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a
restriction on advertising."). Id. at 344.
268 See infra note 273.
269 See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 578-79 (Blackmun & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
270See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 157, at 769-71.
271 Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46.
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 16:85, 1999
consumption of the disfavored product or service necessarily implied the
ability to limit speech about that product or service, advertising for any
product or service-from ice cream to banking-could presumably be
eradicated by the government. 2 The Posadas approach, if pushed to its
logical conclusion, would therefore fly in the face of twenty years of
Supreme Court case law affording constitutional protection to
advertising. 7 3
3. Confusion In the Lower Courts
In light of the inconsistency of the Supreme Court's own applications
of Central Hudson, epitomized by its Posadas opinion, it is unsurprising
that the indeterminate four-part test has caused confusion and inconsistent
decisions in the lower courts as well. Some courts (properly) require the
government to prove that an advertising ban will in fact diminish
consumption, and further place on the government a burden to show that
there are not numerous and obvious less restrictive alternatives to the
government's chosen course. Applying this strong interpretation of the
Central Hudson test, for example, a number of circuits have struck down
restrictions on outdoor advertising.274
Other courts, however, follow cases like Edge Broadcasting, giving
deference to the legislature's determination that restrictions on advertising
will in fact diminish consumption. Several recent Fourth Circuit cases
exemplify this more deferential approach to the Central Hudson test. For
example, in Penn Advertising of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor 75 and in
Anheuser-Busch v. Mayor2 76 a Baltimore ordinance regulating advertising
272 Cf Friends of Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The distinction
[between cigarettes and gas-guzzling cars] is not apparent to us, any more than we suppose it is to the
asthmatic in New York City for whom increasing air pollution is a mortal danger.").
273 See supra notes 221-235 and accompanying text. In its more recent decisions on
commercial speech, such as Coors Brewing and 44 Liquormart, the Court has explicitly rejected the
analysis in Posadas. Specifically, in Coors Brewing, the Court flatly rejected the Government's
assertion that "legislatures have broader latitude to regulate speech that promotes socially harmful
activities, such as alcohol consumption, than they have to regulate other types of speech." Coors
Brewing, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2; see also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
762-63 (1988) ("[T]hat [greater-includes-the-lesser] syllogism is blind to the radically different con-
stitutional harms inherent in the 'greater' and 'lesser' restrictions .... [A] law or policy permitting
communication in a certain manner for some but not for others raises the specter of content and
viewpoint censorship.") (footnote omitted). Although the Court's recent decisions might show Posadas
to have been an anomaly, the Central Hudson test that led to such an erroneous decision is still
employed.
274 See, e.g., National Adver. Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1990) (certain
ordinances prohibiting maintenance of off-premises signs unconstitutional); Ackerly Communications
v. City of Somerville, 878 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1989) (ordinance prohibiting maintenance of off-premises
sign boards unconstitutional).
275 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded sub nom. Penn Adver. v. Schmoke,
518 U.S. 1030 (1996), reaff'd, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
276 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded sub nom. Anheuser-Busch v.
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of tobacco and alcohol products was upheld.277
In both the Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch cases, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the city's ban even though it restricted the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.278 In Anheuser-Busch the
Fourth Circuit stated that Baltimore's interest in "protect[ing] children
who are not yet independently able to assess the value of the message
presented" was sufficiently related to a ban on billboard advertising of
tobacco products (except those located in business and industrial areas) to
meet the requirements of Central Hudson.
279
Confusion is an inevitable consequence of asking individual judges to
assess the substantiality of an asserted state interest and weigh it against
the degree of impingement on otherwise protected speech. Balancing tests,
by their very nature, tend to promote unprincipled decisionmaking,
confusion, and judicial inconsistency. As Justice Scalia has noted,
although "[w]e will have .. .balancing modes of analysis with us
forever[,] . . . those modes of analysis should be avoided where
possible., 280 Balancing tests such as the Central Hudson analysis too
easily permit judges to "mistake their own predilections for the law," in
Justice Scalia's terms.281 Especially when dealing with First Amendment
freedoms, as Justice Kennedy has said, "the use of. . .traditional legal
categories is preferable to the sort of ad hoc balancing that the Court"
often performs in First Amendment cases.282 The problems inherent in the
Central Hudson balancing test could be largely avoided if truthful
commercial messages concerning lawful products or services were
Schmoke 517 U.S. 1206 (1996), reaff'd 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569
(1997).
277 These cases were remanded to the Fourth Circuit by the Supreme Court for rehearing
after the Court's decision in 44 Liquormart. See Penn Adver. v. Schmoke, 518 U.S. 1030 (1996);
Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 517 U.S. 1206 (1996). However, the Fourth Circuit reinstated its earlier
decisions to uphold the bans, giving 44 Liquormart a very narrow reading. See Penn Adver. v.
Schmoke, 101 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir. 1996); Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327-28 (4th
Cir. 1996).
278 See 101 F.3d at 333; 101 F.3d at 327-28.
279 Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1996). Even though the
holdings in these Fourth Circuit cases are inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in 44
Liquormart, the Court has denied certiorari in both cases. See Penn Adver. v. Schmoke, 520 U.S. 1204
(1997) (denial of certiorari); Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 520 U.S. 1204 (1997) (denial of certiorari).
Thus, any confusion as to what the Central Hudson test really means is heightened by the Court's own
reluctance to clarify its analysis.
280 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as A Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1187
(1989).
281 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989); see
also Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 513 U.S. 527, 549-50 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (advocating rejection of "ambiguous balancing test" and return to bright-line
rule in admiralty jurisdiction).
282 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (stating that in First Amendment area, "fairly precise rules are better than more
discretionary and more subjective balancing tests").
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accorded the same constitutional protection as other forms of speech.
C. The Wages of Confusion
Because of the inconsistency of lower court decisions under the
Central Hudson test, lawmakers have been emboldened to advance
regulations on commercial speech that might be found invalid by the
current Court, and which are wholly inconsistent with the original
understanding of the First Amendment. At the national level, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) have recently begun to encroach upon areas of commercial speech
that should be constitutionally protected. For example, former FCC
Chairman Reed Hundt seized on the Fourth Circuit's decisions in
proposing to restrict the broadcasting of advertisements for liquor, stating:
"Surely [the Anheuser-Busch decision] means that the First Amendment is
in no way violated by a prohibition on advertising hard liquor on shows
and in time slots when kids are likely to be in the audience in large
numbers-that applies like it or not to very late hours." '283 His successor,
William Kennard, has also indicated an interest in pursuing limits on
spirits advertisements.284
In the same vein, on August 28, 1996, the FDA issued regulations
intended severely to restrict the advertising and promotion of cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco, ostensibly to protect those under eighteen.285 The
breadth of the FDA's proposed restrictions was draconian and
unprecedented. Specifically, the FDA sought to:
" prohibit any use of images or colors in most tobacco product
advertising (outdoor, print, direct-mail), limiting such advertising
to black text on a white background;
286
* prohibit any outdoor advertising for tobacco products within 1000
feet of a public playground or an elementary or secondary school,
including signs on stores stating that they sell tobacco. (In places
such as Manhattan, this is tantamount to a ban on all outdoor
283 Richard T. Kaplar, Court's Refusal to Hear Baltimore Billboard Appeals Sparks Flurry
of New Restrictions. COM. SPEECH DIG., Spring 1997, at 8.
284 See Bryan Gruley, New FCC Chief Shows Willingness to Aid Firms Unable to Pay for
PCS Licenses, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 1997, at BI 1.
285 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,615-18 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897). In the interests of full disclosure, I was
retained by a tobacco manufacturer to present the First Amendment challenge to these regulations in
district court on behalf of a coalition of advertising trade associations and tobacco manufacturers.
286 See id. at 44, 617.
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tobacco advertisements.); 287
* prohibit any sponsorship of any athletic, social, or cultural event
under the name brand of a tobacco product (e.g., Winston Cup,
Virginia Slims Tennis tournament; this ban would apply even if no
children were in the audience, such as at a seniors golf tournament
or an opera); 288
* prohibit the sale or distribution of non-tobacco merchandise
bearing any tobacco product brand name or logo (e.g., a Kool
cigarette lighter or a Marlboro ashtray);289 and
* prohibit tobacco advertising in any medium not approved by the
FDA, unless thirty days advance notice is provided to the
290agency.
Furthermore, these rules barred companies from using color or images to
advertise in any mass circulation magazine if more than 15% of the
readers, or if two million of the readers, were minors, which is how the
FDA defines an adult publication.291 This could preclude tobacco
advertising in People, Sports Illustrated, Better Homes and Gardens, and
Ebony, to name just a few publications.292
At the state and local level, lawmakers are also attempting to restrict
commercial speech about "socially harmful" products. After the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch,
lawmakers across the country introduced or enacted similar ordinances
restricting the outdoor advertising of tobacco products.293 Indeed, as stated
above, at least fifteen local communities are or have been considering bills
and ordinances restricting advertising of alcohol or tobacco products in
some fashion. 94 In many cities, lawmakers cited the success of the
Baltimore ordinance as the impetus for bans on tobacco billboard
advertising.295 Linda Dove, vice president of the American Association of
Advertising Agencies, reported, "[The Association has] seen as many as
40 proposals in different stages and we expect more to come. 29 6 Without a
287 See id.
288 See id. at 44, 618.
289 See id. at 44, 617.
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,596.
293 See Efforts Grow to Curb Ads for Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1997, at A3; see also
Kaplar, supra note 283, at 7-8.
294 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
295 See Efforts Grow to Curb Ads for Tobacco, supra note 293, at A3.
296 Kaplar, supra note 283, at 8.
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definitive statement by the Supreme Court that truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech is entitled to heightened First Amendment protection,
lower courts and local officials will continue to inhibit the free flow of
protected consumer information.
D. 44 Liquormart-A Move in the Right Direction
In 1996, the Court suggested that it may be moving in the direction of
the original understanding of the First Amendment, and may be willing to
give heightened scrutiny to restrictions on the right to advertise. In 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,297 a unanimous Court struck down a
Rhode Island prohibition on the advertising of retail prices of alcoholic
beverages except at the point of purchase. The asserted purpose of the
price advertising ban was to discourage alcohol consumption, in part by
increasing the price of alcohol. 298 A total of seven justices concluded that
the advertising ban failed the fourth prong of Central Hudson because the
State could have pursued its goal through "alternative forms of regulation
that would not involve any restriction on speech.,
299
At least five members of the Court acknowledged the importance of
the colonial history of advertising regulation. Justice Stevens's plurality
opinion referred to colonial America's solicitude for advertising, although
it did not treat that history as determinative. Justice Stevens began his
opinion by stating:
Advertising has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in
colonial days, the public relied on "commercial speech" for vital
information about the market. Early newspapers displayed
advertisements for goods and services on their front pages, and town
criers called out prices in public squares. Indeed, commercial messages
played such a central role in public life prior to the Founding that
Benjamin Franklin authored his early defense of a free press in support of
his decision to print, of all things, an advertisement for voyages to
Barbados. 3
00
Justices Thomas and Scalia explicitly addressed the originalist
argument in their concurring opinions in 44 Liquormart. Justice Thomas
relied on a variant of the historical argument set forth in Parts I and II in
297 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
298 See id. at 1508-09.
299 Id. at 1510 (principal opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsberg, JJ.),
1518-19 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 1521-22 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, C., Souter & Breyer, JJ.).
300 Id. at 1504 (citations omitted).
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rejecting the notion that there was any "philosophical or historical basis for
asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than
'noncommercial' speech. 30° Justice Scalia said that he shared Justice
Thomas's "discomfort with the Central Hudson test," as well as his
"aversion towards paternalistic governmental policies that prevent men
and women from hearing facts that might not be good for them."3 2 Scalia
pronounced the historical material presented by this author in an amicus
curiae brief "consistent with First Amendment protection for commercial
speech, but certainly not dispositive., 30 3 He then posed a number of
historical questions, particularly about state legislative practices during the
colonial and Reconstruction eras, as well as about "any national consensus
that had formed regarding state regulation of advertising. 30 4 The answer
to those questions, Scalia suggested, could determine whether he, too,
would agree that commercial and noncommercial speech deserve the same
measure of constitutional protection.05
44 Liquormart is important not only because of Justice Thomas's
explicit reliance on colonial history, Justice Scalia's openness to
considering this approach, and a recognition by three other justices of the
relevance of colonial history to the analysis. It is also important because of
the Stevens plurality opinion's seeming willingness to jettison prongs two
through four of the Central Hudson test. As Stevens said, "[W]hen a State
entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial
messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands. "3 06
Justice Stevens's opinion in 44 Liquormart applies the Central
Hudson test in a manner more akin to the test the Court applies to
noncommercial speech. Stevens further strengthened the principle, stated
earlier in Discovery Network and Coors Brewing, that a restriction on
commercial speech cannot be considered "sufficiently tailored to its goal"
under Central Hudson if other options exist "which could advance the
Government's asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to . . . First
Amendment rights. 30 7 Applying what appeared to be a narrow-tailoring
requirement, the plurality in 44 Liquormart seems to say that the
government may not restrict commercial speech at all if non-speech-
301 Id. at 1518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).




306 Id. at 1507 (principal opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.)
(discussing a number of policy reasons for applying a higher level of scrutiny to bans on truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech).
307 Coors Brewing, 514 U.S. at 490-91.
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restrictive alternatives are available to serve the government's interest. As
Justice Stevens observed:
[A]ttempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to
regulate conduct. That presumption accords with the essential role that
the free flow of information plays in a democratic society. As a result, the
First Amendment directs that government may not suppress speech as
easily as it may suppress conduct, and that speech restrictions cannot be
treated as simply another means that the government may use to achieve
its ends.
308
Justice Stevens identified non-speech-restrictive alternatives that
undermined the State's claim of reasonable fit. Justice Stevens explained
why "[t]he State . . . cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on
speech be no more extensive than necessary":
It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would
not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the
State's goal of promoting temperance. As the State's own expert
conceded, higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or
by increased taxation .... Per capita purchases could be limited as is the
case with prescription drugs. Even educational campaigns focused on the
problems of excessive, or even moderate, drinking might prove to be
more effective.
As a result, even under the less than strict standard that generally
applies in commercial speech cases, the State has failed to establish a
'reasonable fit' between its abridgment of speech and its temperance
goal.
30 9
Thus, even though Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg did not
expressly accept the original understanding of the First Amendment's
protection of commercial speech, the 44 Liquormart plurality opinion does
suggest that these justices might be willing to afford greater protection for
commercial speech than the Central Hudson test currently contemplates.
Even those justices explicitly relying on the four-factored Central
Hudson test appeared to apply stricter scrutiny to the truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech at issue in the case than the Central
Hudson test often requires. The concurring opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Souter, Breyer, and the Chief Justice determined that a ban on advertising
of liquor prices was not significantly related to the purported interest to
308 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 512.
309 Id. at 507.
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pass scrutiny under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis.310
Justice O'Connor echoed Justice Stevens when she wrote:
The availability of less burdensome alternatives to reach the stated
goal signals that the fit between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends may be too imprecise to withstand First
Amendment scrutiny.
The fit between Rhode Island's method and [its temperance] goal is
not reasonable. If the target is simply higher prices generally to
discourage consumption, the regulation imposes too great, and
unnecessary, a prohibition on speech in order to achieve it. The State has
other methods at its disposal-methods that would more directly
accomplish this stated goal without intruding on sellers' ability to
provide truthful, nonmisleading information to customers .... A tax, for
example, is not normally very difficult to administer and would have a
far more certain and direct effect on prices, without any restriction on
speech. The principal opinion [by Justice Stevens] suggests further
alternatives, such as limiting per capita purchases or conducting an
educational campaign about the dangers of alcohol consumption. The
ready availability of such alternatives-at least some of which would far
more effectively achieve Rhode Island's only professed goal, at
comparatively small additional administrative cost-demonstrates that
the fit between ends and means is not narrowly tailored.
3 1 1
In sum, the opinion seems to say that when the government can
advance its goal through direct regulation of conduct and other non-
speech-restrictive means, the government may not pursue that goal by
restricting otherwise lawful speech.31 2  This approach more closely
resembles the least restrictive means analysis employed under a strict
scrutiny test of the sort employed in assessing government restrictions on
310 See id. at 504-08 (principal opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter &
Ginsburg, JJ.), 528-30 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Rehnquist, CI., Souter &
Breyer, JJ.).
311 Id. at 529-30 (citations omitted); see also id. at 524-25 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
312 This analysis is also consistent with earlier opinions by the Court. See Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1995) (prohibiting alcohol content being displayed on labels, but
permitting it in advertisements unless prohibited under state law); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 764
(1993) (prohibiting CPA's "direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation"; permitting other means); Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 470-73 (1988) (prohibiting lawyers' targeted, direct-mail
solicitation for pecuniary gain; permitting other modes of written advertising); Bolger v. Young Drug
Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 62-63 (1983) (prohibiting mailing of contraceptive advertisements;
permitting other means of contraceptive advertising); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 86 (1977) (prohibiting "For Sale" and "Sold" signs; permitting same information to be
conveyed by other means).
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so-called "fully protected" speech. Although seven justices have not
openly accepted an originalist understanding of the First Amendment
protection of commercial speech, the analysis employed in 44 Liquormart,
if applied consistently, will often produce results consonant with that
understanding. By applying a standard more like that applied in
noncommercial speech cases, the Court inches closer to adopting an
interpretation of the First Amendment that is consistent with its original
meaning..
Conclusion
This Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court's recent approach
to commercial speech has been neither principled nor consistent. It has
been unprincipled because, as a doctrinal matter, the Court continues to
resist the conclusion compelled by the historical evidence presented above:
that neither the generations of the Framers nor of those who drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment believed commercial speech to be of less value
than other categories of speech. Perhaps resulting from this improper
historical understanding of the First Amendment's meaning, the Court's
commercial speech jurisprudence has been inconsistent as well; although
the Supreme Court generally has required the government to bear a heavy
burden in its efforts to justify restrictions on commercial speech, 1 3 in a
handful of cases the Supreme Court has suggested that the judgment of
legislators about advertising and its effects ought to be given deference.314
Therefore, for both principled and prudential reasons, the Court should
renounce the Central Hudson balancing test, and afford commercial
speech full constitutional protection.
Moreover, giving heightened scrutiny to restrictions on truthful
commercial messages about lawful products and services would have the
salutary effect of constraining politicians. The proposed analysis would
avoid the danger of unlawful censorship that will exist so long as
commercial messages are formally subjected to a reduced level of
constitutional protection-where suppression of speech remains a potential
tool for policymakers seeking to influence consumer choice and where the
outcome of each case turns on the subjective evaluations of individual
administrators, legislators, and judges. In addition, the adoption of a
categorical approach would eliminate much of the confusion and
inconsistency that has marked efforts by the lower courts to implement the
existing four-part "balancing test."
313 See supra notes 221-235 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the historical evidence presented here has broader
implications for the First Amendment generally. It suggests that the
generation of the Framers had in mind a dichotomy not between
commercial and noncommercial speech, but instead between truth and
falsity. Plainly, under a truly "originalist" First Amendment jurisprudence,
false commercial speech-fraud--could be regulated, as could libelous
statements about individuals.315  Furthermore, other categories of
demonstrably and deliberately false speech-for instance, false scientific
speech-could presumably be constitutionally regulated and punished if it
were to cause identifiable harm to a particular individual.31 6 However,
such a standard would not require that the Supreme Court in any way scale
back its rigorous protection of political speech; the Court has properly
observed that "under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea,"317 and the inability to test and prove whether a political idea is
"true" would ensure that such speech remains constitutionally protected.
Notwithstanding the other potential implications of this Article's
historical analysis of First Amendment doctrine, it is evident that the
Court's current jurisprudence is underinclusive in one critical respect: it
provides less protection than is warranted for truthful commercial
communications about lawful products and services. In one of the
decisions in which the Supreme Court properly protected commercial
speech, the Court noted:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of the public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
318
Adhering to such a principle does not mean that people will never be
misled or offended even by truthful advertisements. Nor does such a
principle guarantee that people will always make the right decisions. But
315 The Supreme Court currently acknowledges that false and defamatory statements about
individuals are not constitutionally protected. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
However, to avoid a "chilling" effect on political discourse, the Court has afforded constitutional
protection even to false and defamatory statements on matters of public concern as long as the person
making the statement does not do so with "actual malice." Id. at 21. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to discuss in detail the merits of the constitutionalization of libel law.
316 Of course, to say that such a category of speech may be outside the bounds of the First
Amendment does not mean that the legislature should, as a policy matter, regulate it. There may be
sound public policy reasons why a legislature may wish to forbid lawsuits against those who
deliberately disseminate demonstrably false scientific information under certain circumstances, for
example.
317 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
318 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976).
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 16:85, 1999
in order to "preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy," the
American people must be trusted with "a free flow of commercial
information" unhindered by concerns about government interference.
Accepting an interpretation that the original understanding of the Framers
was to protect commercial as well as noncommercial speech is the best
way to guarantee that the First Amendment will preserve individual liberty
and economic freedom.
